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Abstract 
In the very recent past, military conflicts have become increasingly nonlinear and the 
interrelated political and socio-economic changes evident in these conflicts have created 
new challenges to American policymakers.  The purpose of this single case study was to 
determine whether Wallis’ Propositional Analysis (PA) is an effective explanatory lens 
that adds heuristic value to complex policy decision-making.  A backdrop of 
Wallerstein’s complexity theory and complex adaptive systems (CAS) guided this study.  
This study examined the Obama administration’s policy for the Afghanistan and Pakistan 
conflicts in late December 2009.  Data for this study consisted of policy statements made 
by the Obama Administration beginning in December 2009.  Data were coded analyzed 
using Wallis’ specific methodological approach that includes a systematic analysis of the 
policy’s propositions and complexity and robustness/systemicity.  Key findings indicate 
that PA is an effective method of evaluating complex and nonlinear public policy 
environments.  In addition to effectively explaining and adding predictive value to the 
analysis, it is consistent with the theoretical principles associated with complex adaptive 
systems.  Finally, this study demonstrated that an interwoven PA structural approach to 
policy analysis, along with empirical approaches, may validate causal relationships 
between factors and variables that ultimately may lead to better policy development.  By 
applying PA, policy makers can positively impact social change by exploring policy 
options that ultimately save lives and resources and consider a range of possible complex 
outcomes from the policy proposal – prior to policy implementation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Background of the Study 
Public policies serve a critical role because they not only represent an explicit 
statement of how the policy problem is conceptualized and understood but they also 
inform how the policy issues will be addressed (Wallis, 2011).  Dery (1984) argued that 
policy problems present themselves as requirements for change through policy action.  
Ackoff (1974) argued such “policy action” actually represents a series of dynamic 
changes whereby the scope and boundaries, the complexity and interrelatedness of a 
broad range of problems, must be considered at once when developing policy for such 
complex environments.  These scholars are among those to be discussed in the present 
study and whose research on policymaking has been set against a backdrop of complex 
environments.  They have examined characteristics of systems’ interactions within 
broader systems including, for example, social systems, belief systems, and the 
policymaking challenges that arise as a result of dynamic behaviors.   
With a recognition that policies themselves reflect how complex environments are 
understood, policymakers are beginning to turn to new theories that can help provide both 
a theoretical and methodology framework for how to analyze policies and complex policy 
environments.  It is be argued that if policy environments are complex, then the way in 
which policymakers develop policy should employ rigorous methods of policy analysis 
derived from a rich body of research found with the domain of complexity theory (Banks, 
2008; Wallis, 2011).  
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Complexity theory provides a conceptual framework designed to analyze 
complex, ill-structured, or, as they are often described, ‘wicked problem’ policy 
environments (Mitchell, 2009).  As such, the theoretical framework needs further 
exploration with regard to its potential applications towards policymaking (Mitchell, 
2009).  One reason for this exploration is that current research suggests that the thinking 
has changed about how to fully conceptualize a policy issue and develop a subsequent 
policy within the realm of complex operational environments such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan (Wallis, 2011). Policymakers need to consider how knowledge is generated, 
reflect on such epistemology and habituated methodological processes used for 
developing public policy, and consider how theoretical frameworks constrain how a 
policy issue is perceived and developed (Dent, 1999; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Wallis, 
2011).   
This charge is largely made in response to an awareness that the nation is 
witnessing and is part of an era of persistent complex conflict, and that the changing 
nonlinear nature of conflict and warfare has changed how conflict is conceptualized 
(Bousquet, 2011; Hall & Citrenbaum, 2013; Lawson, 2014).  It is now common to read of 
the interrelated, intersubjective, and multifactorial aspects of political, social, and 
economic features of the conflict environment nested within the more traditionally 
understood insurgent and terrorist activity of this country’s adversaries (Caldwell, 2011; 
Hall & Citrenbaum, 2010; Holland, 2012; Lawson, 2011; Lawson, 2014; McChrystal, 
2013).   
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The increasingly globalized scale of dynamic factors contributing to such 
complex environments reveals the difficulties faced in developing robust public policies.  
Banks (2008), for example, has argued tools used to support decisions from policy 
analysis can benefit from “robust options” that are derived from a broad range of 
theoretic frameworks and assumptions (p. 123).  Policymakers must choose the right 
methods and descriptive theory for the development of public policy in the context of 
how complex, nuanced mosaics of local events and global influences bear on how policy 
is developed.  Too often, policy recommendations concerning complex environments are 
conceptualized without regard to the dynamic and interactive behavior inherent in such 
conflicts (Anderson, 2003; Brachman, 2008; Chapman, 2004; Dennard et al., 2008).  
The time to think about complexity and change, and how change will occur in a 
future contested, complex policy environment, is before the policy is implemented.  The 
time to ask the question, “What role does the policy itself play in the outcome?” should 
also be asked beforehand (Wallis, 2011).  A body of scholarship has emerged on the 
systems comprised of humans and their interactions within broader systems and the 
problems that arise as a result of dynamic behavior (Ackoff, 1974; Dery, 1984; Dennard 
et al., 2008).  If complex policy environments are just that, complex, then the way in 
which policymakers develop policy should employ rigorous methods of policy analysis 
derived from a rich body of research found with the domain of complexity theory (CT) 
(Wallis, 2011). Yet rather than adopt a holistic or systems thinking approach to the 
conflict and subsequent policy development, policymakers tend to disregard the complex 
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environment’s critical systems characteristics, opting instead to apply reductionist 
approaches to the analysis of the problems (Marion, 1999).   
A Post-Positivist Perspective  
The philosophical origins about how knowledge is derived is addressed early in 
this study and as part of the introduction.  Much of the way in which knowledge is 
generated, it can be argued, is currently grounded in a positivist philosophy, yet should be 
questioned (Wallerstein, 2001, 2004).  Current and future complex environments require 
theoretic models that, arguably, are oriented on the complex.  The positivist worldview, 
attributed to Auguste Comte from the 18th century, holds that an objective truth can be 
identified through a rigorous application of scientific methodologies. These must focus 
on the relationship of how to test and investigate--that is, testing, in a linear and 
reductionist manner, variables that would yield knowledge and provide for some 
explanation of behavior (Greenfield, et al., 2007; Reed, 2010).  The much-championed 
empirical, repeatable methods of analysis, while applicable in areas of study where 
mechanistic principles and behaviors are present, require new frameworks for complex 
and dynamic conflict issues (Reed, 2010; Wallerstein, 2004).  An example of reductionist 
approaches (positivism) would be when the policymaker focuses on governments, 
political structures, and adversarial groups without regard for the existing social systems 
within the conflict space (Bar-Yam, 2004).  This example is supported by reviewing 
lessons learned from a decade of conflicts throughout the Middle East, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan whereby  
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The lesson of the last decade is that failing to understand the human dimension of 
conflict is too costly in lives, resources, and political will for the nation to 
bear.  Once a conflict commences, it is already too late to begin the process of 
learning about the population and its politics. (Flynn, Sisco & Ellis, 2012, p. 2)   
This statement suggests that a postpositivist approach, whereby scholars accept multiple 
factors will affect how knowledge is derived, could yield more insights into the way in 
which policy analyst approach studies into complex environments and ensuing policy 
development (Jorg, 2011; Reed, 2010; Robson, 2002).   
The changing nature of modern armed conflicts, nested within regional, 
transregional, and global complex social structures should compel a policymaker to 
consider also how a policy is bound.  The literature within the field of public policy 
suggests that policymaking has been constrained by theoretic frameworks that have 
shaped boundary definitions (Midgley & Richardson, 2007; Tait & Richardson, 2008).  
Understanding the complexity of conflict boundaries must include not just physical 
borders, political groups, and balance-of-power boundaries; it must expand to social 
systems, belief systems that reach beyond traditional borders, cultural systems, weapons 
systems, communications systems, governance systems, cyber systems, and an ever-
expanding set of systems yet to be imagined (e.g., the emergent field of robotics). In 
doing so it becomes apparent that policymakers must incorporate a more holistic 
approach to address the issues at hand (Wallerstein, 2001).  Reducing a policy issue to 
simply borders, for example, reflects a reductionist and objective analytic framework that 
persists to this day and impedes understanding the emergent nature of conflict 
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(Wallerstein, 2004).  Specifically, the prevailing reductionist approaches frame complex 
conflict policy issues in terms of static, mechanical metaphors such as force on force, or 
regular verses irregular forces (Bar-Yam, 2004; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011). Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980).  Such reductionist methods restrict discourse on these events to narrow 
boundaries that do not fit the volatile, complex, changing, interrelated, and dynamic 
characteristics inherent in these contemporary conflicts.  For the policymaker and the 
policy analyst it remains imperative that complexity is aptly understood and reflected 
within a policy issue (Jorg, 2011).  
A Systems Framework 
A first step toward effective policy development and analysis is to conceptualize 
the multiple interconnected policy issues as holistically as systems.  One complexity 
descriptor of an environment comprised of multiple systems is that the systems are made 
of properties not readily understood through the analysis of the parts themselves; rather, 
they are understood from the interconnected, interrelated dynamic changes among the 
parts and the systems (Barbasi, 2003). Terms such as emergent behavior or emergent 
property speak to the nonlinear property of change in the system and characterize many 
military conflicts today (Bar-Yam, 2004).  In the case of war and complex conflict 
environments, the policy environment can be understood to comprise properties of 
emergent and nonlinear characteristics where multiple systems interact within the conflict 
environment to include social systems, belief systems, ideological systems, etc. (Bar-
Yam, 2004).  Such complex environments mandate using conceptual tools and analytic 
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methods to better understand the issues while prescribing more robust policies to redress 
such issues (Brachman, 2008; Wallis, 2008a, 2008b, 2010c).  
Hall and Citrenbaum (2010) have argued that existing frameworks used to 
understand how our adversaries operate are inadequate.  Their argument can apply 
towards policymaking as well.  Accordingly, they recommend transforming how 
intelligence analysts conceptualize complex, conflict environments.  Again, this argument 
holds true for a policymaker attempting to craft policy.  Specifically, Hall and 
Citrenbaum (2010) advocated that CT-based approaches would yield better results. This 
argument was reflected in Stolberg’s (2006) research, who argued that existing 
frameworks used to develop public policy could benefit from a systems or CT approach:   
For strategic leaders of the 21st century primarily concerned with the issues of 
foreign policy and national security, the international system with which they will 
be dealing is likely to reflect only partially the traditional international system. 
While the nation-state, first codified by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, remains 
the dominant political body in international politics, its ability to influence events 
and people is being challenged by an assortment of non-state actors, failed or 
failing states, and ungoverned regions. This is occurring in combination with the 
transnational threats posed by terror, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), crime, drugs, pandemics, and environmental degradation, as 
well as by elements of the system that also have potentially positive impacts such 
as globalization and the information revolution. (p. 3) 
The reference by Stolberg (2006) to “the system” is a key concept to consider 
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when developing policy and how systems thinking can influence policy development.  
Stolberg (2006) argued, “The international system frames the forces and trends in the 
global environment; it also frames the workspace of national security policy and strategy 
makers” (p. 3).   
Systems and the September 11th Attacks 
The importance of understanding the systems at play within the policy 
environment relate to the attacks of September 11, 2001, nearly 13 years ago at the time 
of this study.  These attacks underscored the behavior of a complex adversary and the 
multifactorial aspects of policy recommendations that needed to be considered (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004).  Considering how 
adversaries behave within a system of systems drives resource considerations as well.  
Resource coordination, such as fiscal and manpower, competes in a policy environment 
that may or may not fully incorporate the problem’s interrelated complexities (Belasco, 
2011).  This issue and challenge is generalizable to public policy analysts developing an 
array of public policy issues.  In an era of growing fiscal constraint and appreciation for 
the required human contribution to policy solutions, it can be argued that the time to 
assess a policy’s consideration of all the inherent complex factors is before 
implementation.  The human and financial costs associated with public policy failure are 
high.   
When President Obama came into office in 2008, the United States had already 
embarked on three military operations:   
1. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), focused on Afghanistan.  
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2. Operation Noble Eagle (ONE), focused on U.S. military bases and homeland 
security.  
3. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), focused on Iraq (Belasco, 2011).   
These endeavors have incurred significant costs. According to Belasco (2011) 
more than $1 trillion in 9/11 monies has been applied to the Department of Defense 
(DOD), State Department/US Agency for International Development, and veterans’ 
medical costs for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: 
1. $806 billion for Iraq, 
2. $444 billion for Afghanistan, 
3. $29 billion for enhanced security, and 
4. $6 billion unallocated. (p. 1) 
It is argued, therefore, that, given a better understanding of such systems’ 
complexity and applying this understanding to policy development processes, there is the 
opportunity to save priceless blood and treasure. How, then, can one better understand 
how to develop public policy when the policy’s characteristics to be addressed are nested 
within complex, interrelated, and dynamic world systems that are constantly changing?  
This dissertation study explores this question.   
Public Policy and Complexity Theory 
There is growing recognition in the field of public policy that complexity theory 
may help policymakers develop a better understanding of how to analyze complex policy 
environments (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Holland, 2000; 
Morçöl, 2012; Wallis, 2010, 2010c, 2011).  An emerging body of literature on 
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complexity theory (CT) has applied CT to analyze the complexity generally found in 
military conflicts and globalized conflicts (Bar-Yam, 2004; Hoffman, 2006; Jones & 
Rand, 2011; Simon, 2008).  This theory offers a conceptual framework that facilitates a 
more holistic pursuit of understanding and knowledge.  The body of literature suggests 
that the theory is particularly promising for those focusing on complex policy issues 
wherein social phenomena and conflicts are intertwined (Bar-Yam, 2004; Dennard et al., 
2008; Sawyer, 2008). 
There is no unified definition of complexity theory.  Complexity theory in general 
acknowledges new and emerging changes and adaptation occurring within a dynamic 
system (Dennard et al., 2008).  Acknowledging that there is no one unified theory, this 
study will refer to complexity theory in the singular as it is the fundamental terms and 
concepts inherent in complex systems salient to this study.  The literature review shows 
that the terms general systems theory, systems thinking, complex adaptive systems theory, 
and complexity theory are sometimes used interchangeably (Dennard et al., 2008; Stewart 
& Ayres, 2001), across a range of sciences from the biological to the social.  This study 
uses the term complexity theory to describe this larger body of related theory.   
Systems analysis does not imply that there is one definition of what a system 
includes, or how to think about a system (Dubin, 1978).  For example, Dubin (1978) 
defined the  
central features of systems analysis as including: (a) the analysis of multiple units, 
(b) with focus on their laws of interaction, (c) producing characteristics 
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[“attributes” as in Chapter 3] of the systems, that (d) are different from the 
characteristics of the individual units composing the system. (p. 265) 
Some other definitions and concepts include terms such as nonlinear, dynamic, co-
evolutionary, emergent, feedback loops, self-organizing, interrelated, and irreversible 
[irreducible or non-reversible]  (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Barabasi, 2003; Dennard et al., 
2008; Gell-Mann, 2003; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997; Stacey, 2007; Waldrop, 1994).  A 
synthesis of the complexity theory concepts could be described as follows:  First, that a 
system is dynamic; that is, the system (or the properties) change over time.  This process 
is not linear.  As complexity theory would suggest, what the system (or properties) 
change into may not be anything resembling what it was at the beginning (Axelrod & 
Cohen, 2000; Barabasi, 2003; Dennard et al., 2008; Gell-Mann, 2003; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1997; Stacey, 2007; Waldrop, 1994).  
Time is a factor that plays into several concepts to describe complexity and 
change; thus, the concept of irreducibility (Prigogine & Stengers, 1997).  Prigogine, a 
Nobel laureate in chemistry, suggested that complexity is characterized by co-evolution. 
The concept of feedback, implying learning and adaptation, is associated with co-
evolution.  This implies that as the components learn and adapt to each other within the 
system, a co-evolutionary process is also taking place (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000).   
To the concept of irreducibility, complexity can be characterized by changes in 
the system.  While it is possible to characterize components separately at a static point in 
time, the components will change due to their dynamic properties, making them unable to 
be characterized in a reduced form outside the context of time (Prigogine & Stengers, 
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1997).  Further, complexity is characterized by its self-organizing properties.  It is 
important to note that these characteristics provide challenges for those attempting to 
predict what will happen next (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Barabasi, 2003; Dennard et al., 
2008; Gell-Mann, 2003; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997; Stacey, 2007; Waldrop, 1994). 
These self-organizing components co-evolve, are nonlinear, and are interrelated, 
irreducible learning systems, providing feedback and adapting to the environment 
(Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Bar-Yam, 2004; Bousquet, 2011; Bousquet & Curtis, 2011).  
 With an appreciation for systems behavior, the challenge, then, is how to 
consider these interrelated, complex, changing, and evolving relationships during policy 
development. The policymaker must consider unintended or unanticipated changes.   
Hinting at the value of understanding the dialectic processes for change, Morçöl 
(2008) asked, “What is complexity theory’s contribution to our understanding of policy 
analysis?” (p. 24).  Dennard et al, (2008) suggested real-world complexity must be 
addressed, and argued that “social change happens in the transition from one stage of 
order to another.  Policies therefore that address only the past or the ideal of the future 
often miss or distort the evolutionary processes already afoot in society” (p. 9).  Dennard 
(2008) argued that it is “not sufficient, however, to describe these outcomes merely as a 
policy failure.  It is more to the point here to say that the outcomes demonstrate the 
effects of not understanding the dynamics of an adaptive system (p. 80).  Policymakers 
must account for the complexities within the systems that represent the problem space 
(i.e., the complex environment).  Morçöl (2008) stated, “Public policies emerge from the 
nonlinear interactions of the human and natural realms and complexity theory can make a 
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unique contribution to our understanding of such nonlinear and emergent phenomena” (p. 
24).   
As stated, there is an emerging body of scholarly research focusing on complexity 
and its relationship to public policy development as critical to policy development (see 
Anderson, 2003; Bar-Yam, 2004; Barbasi, 2003; Brachman, 2008; Caldwell, 2011; 
Dennard, 208; Dye, 1992; Fuchs, 2002; Hajer, 2006; Jorg, 2011; Kauffman, 2010; 
Kilkullen, 2011; Morçöl, 2002, 2008, 2010, 2012; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997; Wallis, 
2008a, 2010a, 2013a).  Denhardt (2011) supported the theme, suggesting that theory and 
practice are disconnected within the public policy by stating:   
A theory is not simply an arrangement of facts or values but a thoughtful 
reconstruction of the way we see ourselves and the world around us.  It is a way 
of making sense of a situation.  Theories may then be evaluated in terms of their 
capacity to help us see our world more clearly and to act more effectively in that 
world. (p. 10) 
Denhardt’s (2011) statement is powerful.  A theory reconstructs our 
understanding of our world (Denhardt, 2011).  By rephrasing Denhardt (2011), Morçöl 
(2008),  Wallis (2013a) and others researching policymaking issues, one could assert that 
that the policy text itself can be described as a policy (theory) being nested in a (complex) 
system or environment interrelated to two sides.  On one side is a theoretic framework 
that helps to inform and shape one’s level of understanding about the environment and 
the issue; on the other side are the decisions or strategies wherein to commit blood and 
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treasure toward the problem (Birkland, 2011; Clausewitz, Howard, Paret, & Brodie, 
1984; Denhardt, 2011; Dennard et al., 2008; Dubin, 1978; Wallis, 2010c).   
  
Figure 1. A graphical representation of the progression from theoretical framework to 
policy (as a theory) to decision making (strategy). 
One can contend that scholars generally agree that complexity theory responds to 
these exigencies (Dennard et al., 2008). Such thinking reveals how conceptions are 
formed, and advances methods for fashioning and implementing more effective policy. 
However, policymakers find it difficult to incorporate these theoretic constructs and 
methods (Jorg, 2011).  Complex systems thinking represents a paradigm shift for 
policymakers addressing conflict and policy development.  The complexity theory’s core 
premise is that the underlying nature of many phenomena, including conflict, can be 
characterized by its complex, emergent, robust, nonlinear or systems behavior (Bar-Yam, 
2004; Jorg, 2011).  Complexity theory presupposes that conflict is rooted in complex, 
robust, nonlinear behavioral patterns.  This theoretic perspective contradicts established 
approaches such as classical or neorealism, which define conflicts in terms of predictable 
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outcomes, and therefore amendable to redress through linear, reductionist methods of 
analysis (Bar-Yam, 2004).       
Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS) 
It remains relevant to this portion of the introduction to delve deeper into the 
discussion of complex adaptive systems (CAS) as part of the complex systems thinking 
discussion.  CAS, as a term found in complexity theory, is also a term used to describe 
U.S. adversaries (Bousquet, 2011; Kilkullen, 2003). The conflict and complex 
environment that the 2009 U.S. Obama administration’s Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(hereafter referred to as AfPak) policy sought to address regarding al-Qaida has been 
described also as a CAS (Bar-Yam, 2004; Bousquet, 2011; Gerges, 2009; Hall & 
Citrenbaum, 2010; Jones & Rand, 2011;  Kilkullen, 2003; Lacey, 2008; Lia, 2008, 2009).  
Additionally, the AfPak environment was described as a complex environment  based on 
President Obama’s 2009 policy, amalgamating both Afghanistan and Pakistan into one 
policy (Fitzgerald & Gould, 2011; Obama, 2009; “White Paper,” n.d.) thereby presenting 
new challenges to the policymaker .  
Simply stated, the term CAS is used to described complex military environments 
and our adversaries such as al-Qaida and affiliated groups and adversaries operating 
within Afghanistan and Pakistan (Bar-Yam, 2004; Bousquet, 2011; Gerges, 2009; Hall & 
Citrenbaum, 2010; Jones & Rand, 2011); Kilkullen, 2003; Lacey, 2008; Lia, 2008, 2009; 
The Situation in Afghanistan, 2011; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009).  The 
CAS description and characteristics are relevant to this study as policy recommendations 
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concerning Afghanistan and Pakistan continue to present unique challenges to 
policymakers and analysts alike (Connable & Rand, 2012; Kilkullen, 2003).   
The complexity-theoretic framework and the related CAS theories have a broad 
following. Research has emerged from a wide range of academic disciplines, focusing on 
the ever-changing, dynamic processes and larger patterns that frequently emerge from 
individual systems components to form larger collective interactions within a system (e.g. 
Bousquet, 2011; Cartwright, 1991; Cilliers, 2002; Gell-Mann, 2003; Holland, 1995, 
2000).  CAS theory and complex adaptive problem analysis focuses on the nonlinear, 
interactive dynamic processes that adapt, emerge, and change from systems interactions 
of both its individual components and the systems components that it forms (Connable & 
Rand, 2012; Holland, 1995, 2000; Kilkullen, 2003).    
Newton, Reductionism, 19th-Century Social Science Theory, and Systems Thinking 
To recognize and conceptualize where the research and practical applications of 
policymaking could be made more effective, it is necessary to ask the following question: 
What does complexity theory stand in contrast to?  It is necessary to introduce a brief 
discussion on the holistic verses reductionist methods of conceptualizing and analyzing 
an issue.  The term reductionist or reductionism is often conflated with the term 
“Newton-era thinking” in this context (Geyer & Rihani, 2010).  Geyer and Rihani (2010) 
associated the pursuit of order or, as they call it, “Newton-era thinking,” with what they 
call the Newtonian “paradigm of order” that has foreshadowed public policy analysis 
advancements with the following four golden rules: 
1. Order: given causes lead to knowing effects at all times and places. 
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2. Reductionism: a system’s behavior could be understood in clockwork 
fashion by observing the behavior of its parts.  There are no hidden 
surprises; the whole is the sum of the parts, no more and no less. 
3. Predictability:  once global behavior is defined, the future course of events 
could be predicted by applying the appropriate inputs to the model. 
4. Determinism:  processes flow along orderly and predictable paths that have 
clear beginnings and rational ends. (p. 13)   
Those who point to an absence of positive social changes from such Newtonian or 
linear thinking are critical of these “golden rules.”  For example, Dennard et al. (2008) 
argued, “Policy analysts can point to social programs that have survived and 
complexified and budgets that are balanced, but not necessarily to the alleviation of 
poverty, the end to traffic congestion, pollution, crime or even effective and ‘cost-
efficient’ warfare” (p. 8).  The premise that change can be understood absent a systems-
thinking perspective is a recurring theme within this body of research.   
From Reductionism to Complexity 
Within public policy, scholars have observed the epistemological limits of 
Newtonian-thinking as not showing much utility for current (and future) emerging 
complex conflicts (Abraham, 2001; Lee & Wallerstein, 2010; Wallerstein, 2001; Wallis, 
2013a).  The Newtonian framework suggests that social issues and conflict are framed 
around a construct of balance of power, with actors as variables interacting within a more 
static power struggle and clearly defined boundaries.  Policies resulting from this 
framework will not have considered the more nuanced complexity of the issues 
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(Wallerstein, 2001).  An analytic framework employing such a linear cause-and-effect 
type approach does not adequately account for what happens between entities.  More 
precisely, it does not account for those interdependencies or interactions that happen 
between entities and the social systems wherein they reside (Donnelly, 2000; Jorg, 2011).  
The suggestion, derived from linear approaches informed by Newtonian thinking, is that 
a policy can be developed absent the context of the systems within which they reside.  
These ideas have compelled analysts and policymakers to look to new theories that take 
on a more multidimensional approach (Cilliers, 2002; Dennard et al., 2008; Jorg, 2011).   
The present research focused on the 2009 Obama administration policy toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The regional conflict that the Obama Administration 
attempted to mitigate through policy, represent a continuum of change, evolution, 
adaptation, and learning from among and between systems that can be described as 
complex (McChrystal, 2013; Obama, 2009; U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2009; “White Paper,” n.d.).  Events that play out on and within this metaphoric stage 
have come to be described more aptly as a sequence of complex, adaptive, and changing 
variables.  It is those human interactions set amongst the systems of culture, politics, 
economics and values that add an aspect of nonlinear processes that shape the conflicts 
and security challenges that our nation faces (Bar-Yam, 2004).  A linear view of the 
conflict could be posed as a stability to conflict and back to stability model.  This would 
represent a Newtonian-type reductionist approach to how the policy problem is 
conceptualized and constructed (Bar-Yam, 2004). A nonlinear set of descriptors to 
describe the model would reflect a constant state of change whereby new events (stimuli) 
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change the original aspect of stability and learned lessons are incorporated into the cycle 
of change (adaptation).  It is therefore nearly, if not, impossible to return to the original 
state (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009; Dennard et al., 2008; Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Holland, 
2000; Morçöl, 2012; Wallis, 2010a).   
The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms: Unthinking Social Science 
Wallerstein (2001) argued social scientists should consider new evidence that 
“undermines old theories and predictions” (p. 4).  He advanced the idea that a world-
systems analytic framework would enable “a contemporary perspective on the social 
world, one that makes central the study of long-term, large-scale social change” (p. 4).  
He rejected the Newton-informed paradigm or theoretic framework that largely informed 
the social sciences (Wallerstein, 2001).  Wallerstein (2001) argued that rational, scientific 
explanation, based on reductionist and linear views of how social constructs could be 
analyzed, was not able to address matters of changing dynamics in a holistic, long-term 
systems sense. He added that the “the holy trinity of politics/economics/ society-culture 
has no intellectual heuristic value today” if viewed as separate fields of study (as they 
have been historically studied), with little thought given as to how to thinking holistically 
about issues nested in the systems wherein they reside, are related (p. 264). Wallerstein’s 
(2001) dialectical model presented the proposition’s and counter-proposition’s opposing 
ideas and the transition of those ideas from thesis to antithesis (implying change over 
time) and argued that social systems’ realities compete and interact with the  real world 
systems of ideology, beliefs, culture, and economics. They all intersect, interact, and co-
evolve into the need to become the dominate way of thinking (Wallerstein, 2001).   
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Wallerstein (2001) suggested that a concatenated or dialectic model enabling the 
conceptualization of change is needed whereby social change emerges in a nonlinear 
way, reflecting the dialectic process between competing systems.  More pithily, 
Wallerstein (2004) argued, the behavioral and social scientists failed to recognize “the 
possibility that their poor results in the public policy arena resulted not from the failing of 
the social scientists as empirical researchers, but from the methods and theoretical 
assumptions they had taken over from Newtonian mechanics” (p. 23).  With regard to 
theoretical frameworks and the field of social sciences, Wallerstein (2004) was not alone 
in this charge (Flood & Carson, 1993).  Jorg (2011) also argued that there was a crisis 
within the social sciences. He advanced the idea that complexity inherent with the social 
systems needs to be better understood if social scientists are to effect positive changes 
(Jorg, 2011).  
Newton-era thinking and 19th century social science conceptual frameworks of 
how to understand and make sense of the world are two centuries removed from the 
world today.  This topic will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.    
The present study emerged from the intersection of two areas:  public policy 
analysis exploring the applications of complexity theory toward policy development, and 
the study of complexity theory and complex environment characteristics and concepts. 
While a growing number of studies have employed complexity-based approaches to 
policy analysis, a large portion of such studies focused on post-policy outcomes instead 
of how the conceptualizing of the policy issue itself and the written policy reflect upon 
the policy outcome.  A considered review of public policy theories, models, methods, and 
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theoretical frameworks applied toward making public policy yields few insights into how 
to analyze a policy prior to its implementation.    
One notable exception stands out, however: propositional analysis, developed by 
Wallis (2011).  Wallis’s (2011) empirically grounded research incorporated complexity 
theory principals with the role of the policy text itself as a linchpin in successful policy 
development and policy outcomes.  Wallis determined that there is a correlation to the 
complexity and robustness/systemicity of the actual policy text to that of the policy’s 
success or failure.  Wallis’s studies were informed by his literature review “questioning 
the usefulness of theory” in the social sciences and policy formation.  He found that 
complexity theory yields insights into how to develop public policy (p. 19).  Wallis 
(2011) then developed a policy analysis method that shows promising results.   
Propositional Analysis and Complexity Theory: Toward Policy Analysis 
Propositional analysis is a method derived from complexity theoretic concepts 
(Wallis, 2013).  It is paradigmatic in its own right as it applies to thinking about how to 
conceptualize a policy.  The topic of this study is public policy analysis using complexity 
theory, specifically, Wallis’s (2011) method of public policy analysis, termed 
propositional analysis (PA).  More precisely, this study focuses on PA’s heuristic value 
as a paradigm and its application to better public policy development.   
For this study, the PA paradigm is thinking about complexity and robustness/ 
systemicity when drafting public policy.  Wallis (2008) argued,  
A policy is better understood as a cognitive structure representing how we 
understand the world so that we know what to do to achieve our goals.  Policy 
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analysis is important because each policy serves as a guide for decisions of 
organizational, corporate, community, national, and global importance (p. 13).   
Public policy also informs decisions on issues ranging from resource allocation to 
monetary and human treasure; in other words, the “text of the public policy, itself, may 
be seen as a ‘lynchpin’ in the process of research and practice that determines the 
effectiveness, efficiency, and the validity of decisions” (Wallis, 2011, p. 13).   
Propositional analysis, as applied by Wallis (2008c, 2011), is a public policy 
analysis method incorporating systems thinking (complex systems) to examine the 
internal structure of the policy text (the discourse or narrative).  PA is focused on the 
textual policy propositions and their co-causal relationships.  The PA method identifies 
the policy’s propositions and concepts and the text’s “relationships between co-causal 
aspects,” the causal propositions within the text, and their linked propositions to 
determine those aspects that are “concatenated” (p. 85).  The numbers of concatenated 
aspects within the policy are quantified, resulting in an overall score of complexity to 
robustness/systemicity (interrelatedness) (Wallis, 2008c, p. 85).  Wallis (2011) viewed 
concatenation as “one that is influenced, caused, or understood by two or more other 
aspects.”  The PA tool as a method will be described in greater detail in the Chapter 2 
literature review, and in the methods section of Chapter 3.   To support the statement 
earlier that few policy analysis approaches focus on the policy itself, Wallis (2011) 
argued that policy studies “have focused on the goals, reasons, actions, and results of 
policy” (p. 13).  Tying this statement to conflict analysis, one example can be found 
within the homeland security and intelligence communities.  The 9/11 attacks, conducted 
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by al Qaeda, led to charges that the intelligence communities failed to connect the dots 
that could have indicated that the specific attack would take place (Marion, 2011; 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004).  Critics of that 
charge argued that the alleged “failures” resulted from the policies in place at the time 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks  
Upon the United States, 2004). Marrin (2011) argued, “Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, the description of 9/11 as an intelligence failure may be misplaced” and that 
“more important are the strategic policy failures that preceded the tactical intelligence 
failures” (p. 1).  Marrin (2011) suggested that rather than focus on  
the failure of decision-makers to respond effectively to early warning from 
intelligence agencies about the threat from al-Qaeda, one must start with the 
policy environment at the time rather than the adequacy or sufficiency of the 
intelligence that they were provided with. One cannot understand the influence, or 
lack of influence, of intelligence analysis on policy by studying intelligence. 
Instead, one must study policy.  (p. 200) 
In other words, studies focused on policy outcomes overlook the critical linchpin 
that shaped those outcomes, that is, the policy itself.  The point is made that one must 
look to policy.  The distinction is important.  Wallis (2010) argued a policy’s text itself is 
analogous to “a mental model, a schema, a theory, or, more colloquially, a lens or point of 
view.  The policy model acts as a computer program, metaphor, filter, or sense-making 
device.”  (p. 161).  Policy, therefore, can be seen as a theory about how a problem is 
understood.  This theory and understanding thereby shapes policy and thus informs how 
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agencies and organizations respond (Wallis, 2010c).  Birkland (2011) also suggested that 
a policy is generally understood to be a representative model or statement of our 
understanding of an issue or situation.  Understanding this difference enables objective 
policy analysis. Such analysis will result in public policy development in a complex 
environment prior to having to learn from failures, mistakes, and unintended 
consequences that the policy had not considered (i.e., the complexity within the problem 
prior to implementation) (Wallis, 2008a, 2013a).   
While Wallis’s (2011) studies are significant, there is still a knowledge gap in 
using PA in public policy development.  The present research picked up where Wallis left 
off, suggesting that more studies are needed using the PA method. Wallis applied his PA 
method to compare and analyze policy results, whereby the outcome was clear.   
This study expanded Wallis’s approach to policy analysis, yet it does so with the 
intent to learn more about the PA paradigm, as it applied to a complex policy problem.  
This is an important distinction.  Policy results are seldom foreseen when the policy is 
implemented.  Policy results, such as those concerning conflict and wars, cannot be 
known for a long time.  The PA paradigm suggests that important insights into the public 
policy-making process can be learned.  By applying these preliminary findings toward 
another policy study, the research question for this study is as follows:   
Study Research Question 
RQ:  By applying the PA policy analysis approach to the December 1, 2009, U.S. 
Obama administration’s AfPak policy, how can following the PA paradigm lead 
policymakers to discover how to better develop a policy? 
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The PA paradigm argues that thinking about complexity and robustness/ 
systemicity in a policy will lead to better policy development practices.   
Policy Background 
This study proposed that Wallis’s (2011) PA policy analysis method and thinking 
about complexity and robustness/systemicity within the policy would lead to better policy 
development.  The PA paradigm consists of thinking about a policy’s complexity and 
robustness/systemicity.  The policy under study is the December 1st 2009 U.S. Obama 
administration AfPak policy.  The natural setting begins with the complex environment 
facing General Stanley McChrystal in 2009. General McChrystal, Commander, 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and Commander, U.S. Forces 
Afghanistan, stated that the Afghanistan conflict was a “uniquely complex environment” 
(McChrystal, 2009a, Redefining the Fight section, para. 1).  McChrystal was faced with 
the tasks of supporting the Obama administration’s 2009 policy review of the situation, 
providing an accurate environmental assessment, and also of implementing a strategy 
based on the policies set forth by the U.S. government toward that environment 
(McChrystal, 2009a; McChrystal, 2013; Obama, 2009). 
Many complex issues were contributing to the environment of the 2009 
Afghanistan conflict, including regional, transregional, transnational actors, nonstate 
actors, and others (Pillar, 2009). An appreciation for how complex, interconnected, and 
interrelated these issues can be found in the McChrystal (2009a) document known as the 
Commander ISAF (COMISAF) Initial Assessment which detailed a range of variables 
that impacted the complex policy environment.  General McChrystal’s central theme was 
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the need to better understand the problem as a system of causal relationships 
(McChrystal, 2009a).  McChrystal (2009a) argued: 
 While not a war in the conventional sense, the conflict in Afghanistan demands a 
similar focus and an equal level of effort, and the consequences of failure are just 
as grave. The fight also demands an improved and evolved level of understanding 
(COMISAF Initial Assessment, Nature of the Conflict section, para. 1). 
The demand that General McChrystal was speaking to, was in part, to understand   
The most important implication of this view is that no element of the conflict can 
be viewed in isolation - a change anywhere will affect everything else. This view 
implies that the system must be understood holistically, and while such 
understanding is not predictive, it will help to recognize general causal 
relationships (COMISAF Initial Assessment, Redefining the Fight section, para. 
1). 
It will be the theme of recognizing causal relationships that become central to this 
study and evidenced specifically in chapter 4.  
Theory and Policy in a Complex Environment: The Nexus 
Context of the AfPak Policies Analysis 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) 
concluded, 
 The attacks revealed four kinds of failures: in imagination, policy, capabilities, 
and management.  If the government’s leaders understood the gravity of the threat 
they faced and understood at the same time that their policies to eliminate it were 
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not likely to succeed any time soon, then history’s judgment will be harsh. Did 
they understand the gravity of the threat? (p. 340)   
The study also linked policy failures to redress the complexity of the issues 
presented to the “government’s leaders” ability to understand those issues (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 340).  Of the four 
failures noted, this research study particularly focuses on how to improve policy making.  
The charge of policy failure referenced in the study makes a direct reference to a need to 
improve how a policymaker conceptualizes how the issues could be framed, and how 
they are described.  This is further supported in the literature by Benjamin and Simon 
(2006), who highlighted how “the United States, and certainly its leadership, appear not 
to have comprehended the dynamic, ideologically driven insurgency whose heralds were 
four hijacked commercial jets” (p. xiv).  The charge is critical; however, the statement’s 
salient word is “dynamic,” a term that has meaning within the complexity-theoretic 
framework.  These concepts become relevant as the case is made that the ability to 
account for complexity and robustness/systemicity in the policy narrative is both 
necessary and required to avoid such mistakes as the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (2004) referenced.   
In October 2001, the United States began military operations in Afghanistan in 
response to the 9/11 attacks (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States, 2004).  The Bush Administration’s central goals were to compel the Taliban to 
turn over al-Qaeda leaders hiding within Afghanistan and to ensure that al-Qaeda and its 
operatives were not able to train and operate within Afghanistan (H. Res. 107-131, 2001; 
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Woodward, 2002).  President Bush’s policy as articulated in his address to the nation on 
9/11, stated in part that “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who 
committed these acts and those who harbor them” (Bush & Dietrich, 2005).  President 
Bush signaled that his policy understood the conflict to mean that al-Qaeda, with the 
Taliban providing a support base, was attempting to utilize the sanctuary it found within 
Afghanistan to plan, train, and carry out future attacks (H. Res. 107-131, 2001).  
The United States embarked on a campaign in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF), with two purposes: to defeat al-Qaeda, and to remove the Taliban from 
power (H. Res. 107-131, 2001; Jones & Rand, 2011; Lacey, 2008).  Resources, including 
troops, and significant monetary commitments were made to OEF (Katzman & Library of 
Congress, 2005; United States; Bush & United States). However, shortly thereafter, many 
of those same troop resources were diverted to Iraq to support Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(OIF) (The Situation in Afghanistan, 2011).  A statement by General McChrystal in 2009 
echoed the sentiment that resources “have been historically under-resourced and remain 
so today” (McChrystal, 2009, p. 26).  The situation in Afghanistan rapidly deteriorated 
from 2003 to 2009 (Caldwell, 2011).  Shortly after his election, President Obama 
reviewed the situation and devised a new policy to redress the issues (Caldwell, 2011; 
Cordsman, 2002; Dale & Library of Congress, 2012; Obama, 2009).  
Following a considered review of the issues, in early March 2009, President 
Obama presented the December 1, 2009 AfPak policy, resulting from the 
administration’s review of the Afghanistan conflict.  One noted focus from the 
administration towards the conflict was the amalgamation of the two countries into one 
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theater of military operations (White Paper, n.d., p. 1).  With specific reference to 
Pakistan, the President stated, “After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 
2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there” (Obama, 2009, para. 8).   
Al-Qaeda as a Complex Adaptive System (CAS)  
The characteristics of one portion of the environment that of the al-Qaeda 
movement operating among and within the conflict environment, will be explored.  
Policy analysts must consider the characteristics of the al-Qaeda (AQ) problem in the 
AfPak conflict as central to the policy statements.  Complex adaptive systems (CAS) and 
complexity theory were discussed earlier. The CAS connection is expanded here because 
the al-Qaeda problem has also been described as a CAS with an informal global network 
of actors nested within larger systems that shape the environment (Bousquet, 2011; 
Kilcullen, 2005, 2009; Jones & Rand, 2011).  Beyond al-Qaeda having physical presence 
in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, scholars have examined the complexity of the larger 
informal and formal networks of global factors, variables, actors, policy systems, other 
social systems, and belief systems that contribute to the CAS descriptor (Bar-Yam, 2004; 
Gerges, 2009; Hall & Citrenbaum, 2010; Kilkullen, 2003; Lacey, 2008; Lia, 2008, 2009; 
New Strategy, 2009; Situation in Afghanistan, 2011).  As will be discussed in Chapter 2, 
Lia (2009) focused on the theoretical framework, doctrine, and strategies advanced by 
Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one of al-Qaeda’s more prolific writers and senior strategist.    
In at least three ways a lesson can be learned by adopting a systems perspective 
towards such an adversary. First, the systems approach enabled al-Qaeda to achieve 
“success” in terms of their 9/11 attack. Second, their “success” highlights the 
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opportunity, if not necessity, for us to adopt a systems perspective within the realm of 
policymaking and three, to explore new and more useful effective ways to develop policy 
that could attempt to mitigate such adversarial successes.  To summarize the implications, 
those attempting to wage a global jihad have adopted a systems approach to how they 
intend to wage their jihad.  The al-Qaeda phenomena itself has been described as a CAS 
(Kilkullen, 2005; Marion & Uhl-Bein, 2003).   
Problem Statement  
Increasingly, complexity-based thinking is finding its way into the public policy 
domain, challenging the more prevalent approaches to disaggregate and reduce policy 
problems into linear cause and effect problems.  Yet there is still much work to be done 
to explore how complexity-based analytic tools can serve the policy practitioners.  Public 
policymakers still struggle to make good policy that accounts for the increasing 
complexities of our public policy problems.  Dennard et al. (2008) and Wallis (2011), 
among others, have embraced new and emergent tools and methods adapted from insights 
already gained from the complexity sciences and incorporated into the social sciences and 
public policy arena.  Much work remains to be done to test and advance the potential that 
these applications grounded in complexity theory’s promise to deliver.  As some scholars 
would agree, the key to shaping better public policy is rooted in applying complexity-
theoretic frameworks to policy development.  The specific key lies in the methods 
applied to policy development prior to policy implementation.   
Public policymakers today must learn to rapidly grasp the complexities of the 
public policy issues.  The key to understanding such complexities rests with the 
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paradigms used to inform the view of such complexity and changes in the environment.  
Paradigms provide the lenses that shape one’s view of their world.  Not only do 
paradigms provide the theoretical framework for how a problem is understood; they, in 
turn, inform the methods used for the problem analysis.  Social scientists and scholars in 
public policy have increasingly criticized paradigms, policy processes, and theories based 
on linear (mechanistic) thinking that have failed to account for the real world 
complexities existing in social issues (Jorg, 2011).  Public policy and administration 
scholars are looking to new theories to help better understand the complexities of 
problems inherent in public policy (Dennard et al., 2008).  A public policy, more 
specifically, a public policy’s text, serves as the critical statement of how a problem is 
understood (Wallis, 2011).  This text informs, if not directly, the strategies that will be 
required to carry out the policy.  One area largely overlooked in policy research and 
analysis is the role that the actual public policy text plays in framing the problem to be 
addressed (Wallis, 2008b).    
Wallis (2008) suggested that the “text of the policy, itself may be seen as a 
lynchpin in the process of research and practice that determines the effectiveness, 
efficiency, and the validity of decisions” (p. 13).  Propositional analysis, a relatively new 
methodology for analyzing public policy, is a way to measure a policy’s complexity and 
robustness/systemicity (Wallis, 2011).  To develop robust public policies for complex 
and adaptive environments, the critical waypoint must not only account for the 
environment’s complex characteristics, but also reflect the complex environment within 
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the policy to ensure those charged with the strategy development have a more holistic 
view of the problem and can array resources and tasks appropriately.   
An increasingly complex, chaotic, fast-paced, and unstable environment is 
changing how policymakers must think about such dynamics and how to account for 
these dynamics in a policy (Jorg, 2011; Morel & Ramanujam, 1999).  A policymaker 
must quickly grasp the characteristics of such dynamics in order to develop better 
policies wherein the problems are increasingly interconnected, interrelated, and complex.  
Further, a policymaker must understand the policy text itself, represents how the problem 
is understood and drives resources and decisions based on how the issue is framed and 
conceptualized (Dennard et al., 2008; Wallis, 2011, 2013a). 
While there are studies that apply complexity theory to a policy problem 
(Mischen & Jackson, 2008), there are no applications beyond the PA tool that take into 
account complexity as a theoretic framework towards the analysis of the policy itself.  
Such studies are needed in order to learn more about how to aid policymakers in 
developing policy that actually reflects the nuanced aspects of complexity within the 
problem’s environment.  
Analytic policy tradecraft skills, based on linear and mechanistic frameworks for 
how things work, are not suitable for such complex emergent phenomena.  Complexity 
theory, in contrast to linear and mechanistic theoretical frameworks and methods, will 
enable decision makers to (a) broadly consider the complex and interrelated issues within 
the system; and (b) facilitate a better descriptive statement (the public policy text) of how 
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the system looks, thus, influencing decision makers (strategists) on a positive way 
forward.   
In sum, complexity theory is an overarching theoretic framework beginning to be 
embraced within public policy and administration.  The PA paradigm suggests that 
accounting for complexity and robustness/systemicity within a policy will lead to better 
public policy development.  Public policy research on a range of complex social 
problems has included comparatively little critical research on applying PA in a complex 
environment.   
Specifically, in an era marked by complexity, there has been comparatively little 
research and tool development based on a complexity theoretical framework.  There are 
no analytic tools demonstrating how one could analyze a policy and determine if it was 
complex enough to address the complex environment.   
This dissertation will explore the heuristic value of the PA paradigm and its 
contributions towards policy development, as developed by Wallis (2011)  
Definition of Terms 
Aspect: “The part of a policy representing a concept, idea, or notion.  The aspect 
may be as concrete as in “apple,” or as abstract as in “truth.”  An aspect is typically 
detectable, that it to say empirically measurable, but that is not an absolute standard” 
(Wallis, 2011, p. 99).  
Atomistic logic: “A kind of logical structure found within a proposition that is 
reductionist such as “A is valid” or “A is true.” Or, more concretely, “Apples are 
important” (Wallis, 2011, p. 99).  
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Branching logic: “A logical structure found within causal propositions including 
three or more aspects where a change in one aspect causes a change in two or more 
aspects.  For example, a branching proposition might say that changes in A will cause 
changes in B and C.  A more concrete example might be, “More teamwork will lead to 
more cohesion, and more results, and more frustration” (Wallis, 2011, p. 99).  
Complexity: “A measure representing the number of aspects within a policy; the 
calculated diversity of ideas within a policy document.  For an abstract example, consider 
a policy containing the propositions: A is true, more B causes more C, more B causes 
more D.  In such a model, there are four aspects (A, B, C, & D).  Therefore, the policy’s 
complexity is C=4” (Wallis, 2011, p. 99). 
Concatenated Logic: “A logical structure found within a causal proposition 
including three or more aspects where changes in two or more aspects cause change in 
another aspect” (Wallis, 2011, p. 100). 
Integrative analysis: “Combined process of qualitative and quantitative analysis 
involving rigorous hermeneutic deconstruction of text and rigorous re-integration of 
multiple texts following a structured methodology” (Wallis, 2011, p. 101). 
Linear logic: “A logical structure found within a proposition describing simple 
causal relationship between two aspects.  Such as, “More A causes more B.” Both A and 
B exist in a linear relationship to each other” (Wallis, 2011, p. 101). 
Logic model: “A set of interrelated logic statements such as a theory or a policy 
model” (Wallis, 2011, p. 101). 
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Policy: “A cognitive structure (like a theory) representing how a community or 
organization understands the world, thus enabling them to take specific actions to achieve 
their goals” (Wallis, 2011, p. 101).  
Policy model: “Concise representation of a relatively complete policy.  May be 
explicit – as in a diagram or it may be relatively implicit as found in a set of causal 
propositions” (Wallis, 2011, p. 103). 
Proposition: “A proposition is a declarative sentence expressing a relationship 
among some terms” (Wallis, 2011, p. 103).   
Robustness/systemicity: “A ratio describing the interrelatedness between aspects 
of a policy on a scale of one to zero.  Robustness is calculated by dividing the number of 
concatenated aspects by the total number of aspects in a policy.  Robustness is a measure 
of how well integrated the propositions of a policy are, to the degree to which they are 
understood as existing in a systemic relationship, and the level of co-causality between 
the aspects.  Robustness is also related to the effectiveness of the policy in practical 
application”  (Wallis, 2011, p. 104).   
Assumptions  
I made the following assumptions as I undertook this research study:   
1. The documents and testimony provided to the Obama administration 
supporting the 2009 administration’s AfPak issues review were considered 
and based on significant experience on such matters.  
2. General McChrystal (now retired) and the ISAF staff at the time (2009) 
fairly represented the complex Afghanistan and Pakistan environment as 
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they saw it, and that they credibly and reliably documented that complex 
environment before Congress and the public. 
3. The key assumption concerning General McChrystal’s 2009 reference to the 
Afghanistan and Pakistan conflict as a “uniquely complex environment” is 
credible. 
4. The propositional analysis method and paradigm (Wallis, 2011), based on 
the complexity theory principals, will provide insights into how to develop 
policy in a complex environment.   
5. Documents provided to the administration, as a matter of public record, 
were included in the policy development. 
6. The exploratory mixed methods mode of analysis will provide an 
understanding of the issues that will advance an analysis research of policy 
analysis and development. 
7. This study and its findings will be transferable to other policy analysis 
efforts, yielding more insights into how complexity theory and the PA 
approach can enhance credible policymaking.   
Limitations   
This method may not be repeatable, nor the results similar, resulting in an 
alternative analysis (Babbie, 2001). I chose the 2009 Obama Administration’s AfPak 
policy because, as General McChrystal noted, it exemplifies a uniquely complex 
environment (McChrystal, 2013).  While this case study may have similarities to many 
other conflicts, each conflict is different.  Yet the results and findings from this research 
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are expected to be transferable.  It is feasible, however, that this case may not be used to 
understand or discover how PA aids in policy making.  Rather, this study may provide a 
context rich resource of knowledge about how to consider complex systems in the 
environment.   
While this policy arguably represents a complex policy issue, generalizations 
about the findings would be appropriate and in keeping with the intent of this research to 
apply a newly developed tool to policy analysis writ large.  The findings’ generalizations 
should apply regardless the changes in the issues addressed.  This is important to consider 
as the tool itself, while measuring a policy’s complexity, should continue to be applicable 
to a variety of public policies as issues change.  Additionally, it is argued that limitations 
can be overcome with additional study.   
 Scope and Delimitations 
I limited the scope of this research to a single December 1, 2009, Obama 
Administration policy.  The mixed methods mode of analysis was employed, in part, 
because the developer of the method of PA deemed the PA method a mixed method and 
therefore, it is, at once, both the tool used to conduct the analysis and represents the 
paradigm being explored for its heuristic value. The mixed-method approach and scope is 
limited within the quantitative component of this study whereby the proposition’s 
concepts are determined by their complexity and robustness/systemicity scores.  The 
qualitative component is comprised of the exploration of the heuristic value of the PA 
paradigm.  It was proposed that the PA paradigm would yield   insights into policy 
development in complex environments.     
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A detailed analysis of the policy execution strategy (i.e., resource application) was 
not part of this study.  The exception to this statement appears in Chapters 4 and 5, 
whereby possible insights about policy development emerged from the study as to PA’s 
contributions and significance concerning public policy development  specific to possible 
considerations for further execution strategies.   This study did not directly address other 
nations’ policies.  Globalization as it has altered and changed U.S. governance and policy 
development was not addressed, except to note that there are other factors to consider in 
policy implementation.  These factors include other nations’ policies concerning the 
AfPak conflict. These factors suggest that global governance systems impact public 
policy outcomes.  These policies need to be considered as policy development occurs 
(Morçöl, 2012).   
Significance of the Study 
This study has implications for Americans, our Allies, and partners in global 
policy affairs, policymakers, and scholars who are working to learn how to advance 
positive changes in our world.  The study yielded insights for social scientists developing 
public policy for homeland security and administration. Other areas are affected by the 
far-reaching effects of increasingly globalized systems (religious, economic, etc.), as they 
affect our internal homeland security policies as well as our foreign policies.   
The study contributes to the body of knowledge applying complexity theory to 
public policy and administration towards public policy development.  Exploring the PA 
paradigm, the study suggests that insights into this new tool’s application will be 
beneficial to public policy and administration.  Insights are significant with regard to how 
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much a policymaker has considered and reflected upon the complexity of the 
environment within the policy.  
This study is particularly relevant given the continued interest in and engagement 
with Afghanistan and Pakistan public policy issues and other crises around the globe, 
including the resurgent Iraq crisis, the Russian and Ukrainian crisis, and others.  At the 
time of writing, U.S. forces, alongside its coalition partners, had been engaged in 
Afghanistan for some 10 years, with the likelihood of some residual forces while the 
majority of combat troops pull out.  Further, while there may be an end to some military 
engagement, it remains likely that the conflict will continue to require a thorough 
understanding of the conflict’s intricacies as fiscal resources are contemplated and new 
policies emerge.  There will be new requirements to engage in methods other than direct 
war-time engagements (Walker & Malici, 2011).  
If public policymakers are able to shape a clear policy statement reflecting the 
issues’ complexity and realities, the likelihood that the public policy outcomes and the 
ensuing decisions and strategies will lead to successive positive outcomes increases 
(Walker & Malici, 2011).    
Expected Social Change 
The implications for social change from this research include a better 
understanding and practical knowledge (scholar to practitioner) of how to apply the 
theoretical tenets of complexity theory to that of how to practically measure and evaluate 
public policies designed to solve complex problems.  By embracing the theoretic 
concepts of complexity theory, new approaches for how to frame our social issues, to 
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include conflict as is the focus within the public policy in this study, both the public and 
policy actors can influence a more informed public debate about societal interactions and 
improve public policy-making.  If public policies were constructed to reflect the complex 
nature of the problem, then appropriate means (decisions and strategies) and resources 
could be more effectively (fiscally) applied resulting in positive successful outcomes.  
Also, a much more considered debate will have taken place regarding ethical issues 
surrounding the consequences of such public policies.  Public policies, when enacted 
address a wide range of social problems.  Such policies are, by their nature, ethical 
decisions that expound the normative goals and choices articulated by the public and 
government.  Where there are value-judgments with regard to a policy response or where 
there are considered economic implications inherent within a policy, complexity theory 
can help to consider the wide range of intended and unintended effects within the system 
wherein the problem exists and ethical choices will be made.  Better public policies can 
also save lives, in terms of the human costs expended towards public policy solutions.   
Further, the complexity of the issues that public policy addresses can have 
impacts around the world (Chapman, 2004; Cochran, 2012).  A quick check of a local 
news channel can highlight how a local problem can have far reaching consequences at a 
global scale (see, e.g., Straubhaar, 2007).  Straubhaar (2007) explored how globalization 
impacts world news reporting and subsequently, local culture via television using terms 
such as hybridization or globalization in order to describe how a mix of global forces 
combined with local culture produce new norms, adding that “each global force 
combined with a local cultural produces unique changes as the local regions evolve” (p. 
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6).  Global to local interactions and interconnections will require acute attention to policy 
formation—for example, the global financial markets meltdown and its impact of local 
economies, phenomena characterized by the societal uprisings across the Middle East, 
characterized by the term Arab Spring, and its resultant new forms of governance.  
Policies must be written to account for such powerful social network complexities and 
how policy written by one nation can have a global effect (Chapman, 2004; Straubhaar, 
2007).   
The ripple effect of such phenomena, from the global to the local level, brings 
about new challenges and uncertainties.  In a time of great fiscal constraints for many 
trying to effect positive social changes and apply resources to such complex, 
interconnected challenges, the theoretical underpinnings of complexity theory and the use 
of the PA paradigm promise a renewed understanding of our actions as implemented 
through public policies.  The ability to measure a policy in advance of a policy enactment 
would yield positive benefits by having considered, with academic rigor how the 
characteristics of complexity behave and how to consider and think about change in our 
environments.   
This study began with the literature-supported premise that complexity and 
change are a state of norm within a conflict public policy environment. Complexity 
theory appeared to yield great potential for how to understand, analyze, and improve the 
human and social conditions in an era of persistent conflict. By exploring the methods of 
policy evaluation through the lens of the PA paradigm, with its roots in complexity 
theory, new opportunities exist to expand the public policy analysts’ tool-kit and continue 
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to add to the body of knowledge.  The study was intended to highlight the importance of 
measuring the complexity of public policy text as just one tool, of many, in the practice 
of public policy.  This study strongly supports the significant role that public policy 
administrators play in their roles as social change agents.  Public policy seeks to 
influence positive social change with the emphasis on the term social, understood to 
embrace the complexities of the human social networks nested within the realm of a 
multivariate, interconnected range of systems.  
Summary 
This study was conducted to explore the heuristic contributions of the PA 
paradigm, specifically; one set against a backdrop of a complex environment, namely, 
was came to be known as the AfPak problem in 2009.  Chapter 1 addressed the 
challenges posed by complex conflicts and complex environments to that of public policy 
development.  Chapter 1 also characterized complexity and complex adaptive systems.  
The argument is made that the theoretical underpinnings of complexity theory and the PA 
tool and paradigm, as applied to the field of public policy and administration, will aid in 
both measuring a policy and gaining a greater understanding of the complexities of the 
problem the policy was developed for.   
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on complexity theory, public policy models and 
theories, complex conflicts and environments and implications for advancing the field of 
behavioral and social sciences practicing in an era of complexity and change.  Chapter 3 
describes the research design and methodology, the new methodology developed to 
measure the complexity and robustness/systemicity of a policy, namely that of the PA 
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methods, and describes how the data generated from the PA tool yields heuristic insights 
into how better to develop policy.   
In Chapter 4, a synthesis and interpretation of the data is advanced, with added 
perspective for how the PA paradigm does or does not advance the development of public 
policy development.  Chapter 5 advances a holistic summary of the results and findings 
of the study and provides implications for social change.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The study is focused on PA’s heuristic value as a new way of thinking about 
policy development and its application to develop better public policies. For this study, 
the PA paradigm means thinking about the concepts of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity when drafting a public policy.    
This literature review is divided broadly into the following major sections:  
propositional analysis, complexity theory:  implications for the social sciences, 
complexity and public policy, complex environments, policy models, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as a complex adaptive system, and 2009 U.S. Administration policy reviews 
towards Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Due to the complex nature of this study, public policy 
and complexity theory applications will be necessarily nested within each section. 
A number of library databases and search engines were used to obtain material for 
this research including but not limited to Academic Search Premier, Business Source 
Premier, Walden Dissertation Abstracts, Sage Journals Online, and the WorldCat online 
search engine.  The WorldCat search engine resource facilitated access to and helped 
point the literature search towards additional relevant materials from across a worldwide 
network of libraries and literature sources.  The keywords included propositional analysis 
(PA), complex policy environments, complexity and public policy, public policy as 
systems, 2009 Obama Administration policy towards Afghanistan, nonlinear frameworks 
and policy models.  
45 
 
 
Propositional Analysis  
This study uses Wallis’s (2011) propositional analysis (PA) method for analyzing 
the “logical structures of policies to determine what percent of the concepts in a policy 
are well understood.” This literature review begins with a discussion of the theoretical 
underpinnings that inform Wallis’s methodological advances in policy analysis (Wallis, 
2011, p. 5).   
Conceptual Roots of Propositional Analysis 
The conceptual roots of PA may be found in Bateson’s (1979) so-called double 
description metaphor, and method for how to understand the interconnected, interrelated 
systems that inform one’s understanding of evolution and further enable one’s 
understanding of how to conceptualize the systemic nature of patterns and relationships 
within the system.  Bateson was an anthropologist, biologist, and social scientist whose 
work in the field of systems theory, biology, and cybernetics advanced the body of 
literature on how to think about what is broadly defined as our world.  Bateson (1979) 
proposed an analytic framework analogous to the value a binocular brings to a viewer 
called the double description, as a way to explain how “seeing” complexity is a factor in 
the additive value of “lens.”  This observation is based on how the binocular image 
presents a complex synthesis of what each individual eye could not see alone, including a 
finer grain resolution of the boundaries and a closer examination of the details (Bateson, 
1979).  Propositional analysis also draws on Bateson’s work on narration of experience or 
observation.  Bateson’s interest in narrative used to describe experience influenced the 
thinking behind the PA model.  Wallis (2008b) also wanted to better understand how the 
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narratives one uses within a policy reflect a complex image of the policy environment 
and bring about a change in the environment.   
Wallis’s (2011) hermeneutic approach considered Bateson’s (1979) theory of how 
narrative reflects the complexity of an observation and is part of the thinking that 
informed his development of the PA model.  Wallis (2008b) argued that the roles a 
policy’s concepts or narrative propositions play in framing the nature of the problem to 
be addressed are largely overlooked.  While numerous references cited by Wallis (2011) 
informed his lifework on theory development and policy analysis, for the purpose of this 
study two other key references stand out from his research, Goertz (2006) and Dubin 
(1978): 
1. Concepts and their interrelated propositions combine to form a statement of 
one’s understanding about a problem or phenomena (Goertz, 2006).  
2. Theory building or the relationship between systems theory and the 
empirical world yields insights into new ways to analyze a policy (Dubin, 
1978) 
 
Goertz (2006) suggested that the construction of concepts and propositions 
implicitly defined through discussion can lead to “important methodological implications 
for the construction of quantitative measures” (p. 3).  Goertz’s (2006) concept suggests 
that there are approximately three levels to concept building:  
1. the “basic level,” whereby the concept is used as to provide the overall 
theoretical propositions (p. 5),  
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2. the “indicator/data level,” where the concept is operationalized (p. 5), and 
3. the “indicator/data level,” where it is possible to determine empirical 
indicators for analysis (p. 6).   
Goertz (2006) used the theoretical proposition of democracy as an example.  
Democracy represents the first level. The second level adds descriptors such as civil 
rights to form the ontological layer. The third layer adds to the other two in a 
multidimensional manner, for example, adding voting rights or participation to the 
overall concept (p. 6).  Goertz (2006) stated that “these indicators are the variables that 
are actually coded for and form the bases of quantitative measures” (p. 7).  Goertz’s 
argued that each layer within the text or statement of understanding about phenomena is 
“really a theory about the interrelationships of the parts of the conceptual whole” (p. 7).   
Wallis’s (2011) method is also partially informed by the work of Dubin’s (1978) 
study of theory building.  Dubin (1978), who linked the concept of propositional analysis 
and theory together in his own work on theory building, argued that propositions are 
statements of value in relation to other propositions and together combine to form a 
theory about the nature being described.  Dubin (1978) argued that propositions within a 
theory or model act to describe the “conjoined” relationships between all the elements of 
the system’s behavior (p. 166), and concluded that understanding how text serves to 
inform one’s understanding of an issue is tied to how one analyzes an issue.  
Dubin (1978) stated, “If the empirical world is viewed as complex, and our 
theoretical models of it are intended to reflect that complexity, then theorists need to be 
self-conscious of the manner in which their models are made more complex” (p. 255).  
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These two points relate to the broader issue of how to analyze a policy using PA and why 
complex systems thinking serve as the conceptual framework for such analysis, and 
formed the basis of Wallis’s (2011) PA methodology premise.   
Propositional Analysis Applied to Policy 
 Propositional analysis, as applied by Wallis (2008c, 2010b, 2011), is a method of 
analysis that incorporates systems thinking (complex systems) to examine the internal 
structure of a policy text (the discourse or narrative).  Using PA to analyze a policy yields 
two separate measures of the text: complexity and robustness/systemicity (Wallis, 2011).  
The concept of complexity and robustness/systemicity as the two components of PA are 
expanded in this portion of the literature review.   
Wallis (2011) defined complexity as the “calculated diversity of ideas within a 
policy document” and the robustness/systemicity metric “is a specific and objective 
measure of the relatedness between propositions” (p. 31).  Propositional analysis allows 
for the public policy analyst to consider and quantify the concepts within the public 
policy’s propositions as they are “well understood” (their interrelated parts) compared 
with the total number of aspects in the policy” (p. 32).  The PA method analyzes the 
“relationships between co-causal aspects” of the text, the causal propositions within the 
text, and their linked propositions to determine “the total number of aspects (or concepts) 
to “those aspects that are “concatenated” (p. 85).  The numbers of concatenated aspects 
within the policy text are also quantified, resulting in an overall score of complexity to 
robustness/systemicity (Wallis, 2008c, p. 85).  
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Complexity Theory: Implications for the Social Sciences 
Ideas from complexity theory have demonstrated a significant impact of the hard 
sciences from where much of the work of systems theory, cybernetics, artificial 
intelligence, dynamic systems theory, agent-based modeling, chaos theory, and more 
originated. These ideas have contributed to advances in the analysis of complex 
characteristics in a wide range of problems, but applications and research of complexity 
theory toward the social sciences is relatively new (Stacey, 2007).  In 1996, the 
Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1996) reviewed 
how the social sciences addressed societal challenges, specifically global issues, with the 
goal to provide a better future via the contributions made by the social sciences. While 
complexity theory was not central to the discussion, a rejection of a Newtonian 
framework that had influenced the field of social science was central.  The commission 
members began their review with an historical summary of where the social sciences took 
its cues from the 16th century forward with attempts to build a “secular knowledge about 
reality that is somehow validated empirically” (p. 2).   
The Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences (1996) 
determined that the Newtonian framework based on “symmetry” and “Cartesian dualism, 
the assumption that there is fundamental distinction between nature and humans, between 
matter and mind, between physical world and the social/spiritual world” dominated how 
knowledge was understood (p. 2).  The commission determined that this framework led 
to the reasons why social scientists became separated from real complexity and analytic 
methods that would address real world complexity.   
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The charge is further supported in the literature by authors, such as Jorg (2011). 
Jorg (2011) challenged concepts such as deterministic, reductionist, and dualist that he 
found failed the social science community.  His research suggested that the concepts 
became intertwined with methodological constructs and analytic output, resulting in what 
he argued was an “incapacity to deal with the real complexity as a serious topic of study” 
(p. 1).  As a way to counter what he saw as a crisis in the behavioral and social sciences 
he argued for a “different language” (p. 7), and that complexity “can be taken as an 
integrative science, because the same tools of thinking may be of use for the tackling of 
complexity in the variety of scientific realms and disciplines (p. 7).  Jorg suggested 
generative mechanism, generative spaces and generative power as new terms in the social 
scientist tool kit because they reflected a deeper understanding of the realities of the real 
world (p. 8).    
In a further review of the literature and Newton’s impact on the social sciences, 
Fuchs (2002) summed up the shift away from a linear, Newtonian paradigm as follows:  
There is a shift from predictability to nonpredictability; from order and stability to 
instability, chaos, and dynamics; from control and steering to self-organization of 
systems; from linearity to complexity and multidimensional causality; from 
reductionism to emergentism; from being to becoming; and from fragmentation to 
interdisciplinarity. (p. 7) 
The predictable, ordered, reductionist view, an analytic process whereby the 
system is broken down into its smallest elements, trends toward a more narrowly defined 
examination of issues (Fuchs, 2002).  Thus, what is missing from the analysis process of 
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complex issues is the consideration of the behavioral characteristics also found with the 
social sciences and within the systems.  Social issues reside within complex issues and 
themselves include behavioral concepts of  self-organizing, co-evolving, adapting, 
learning, and emergent behavior, all concepts embraced within a nonlinear analytical 
perspective (Checkland, 2005;  Geyer & Rihani, 2010; Harrison, 2006; Holland, 2000; 
Jorg, 2011).  A charge levied against the linear analytic approaches was summarized by 
Harrison (2006), who stated, “The shadow of Newton’s universe continues to obfuscate 
knowledge in the social science” (p. 6).   
Geyer and Rihani (2010) also challenged the social science community with their 
work on complexity and public policy, arguing, “The success of the orderly paradigm in 
the natural sciences had a profound effect on attitudes and practices in all sectors of 
human activity and the social sciences were no exception” (p. 20).  Geyer and Rihani 
(2010) pointed to “a Newtonian vision of an orderly, clockwork universe driven by 
observable and immutable laws” as an example of how the linear analytic approaches 
toward an orderly social science approach negatively influenced public policy analysis (p. 
20).  Their research related how the concepts of an ordered, reductionist, predictable, and 
deterministic mindset influenced public administration.  They argued that phenomena or 
problems, when viewed through the lens of public administration, assuming 
organizational and centralized hierarchy, with clear lines of authority and responsibility, 
and when coupled with the idea that methods derived from linear analytic techniques 
would yield repeatable and verifiable analysis missed the contested, complex and 
unpredictable nature of social systems (Byrne, 1998; Geyer & Rihani, 2010).  
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Beyond Newton: Toward Concepts Grounded in Complexity Theory 
Complexity theory rejects the dominant concept of reductionism and the concepts 
that informed the Newtonian metaphor that the world could be understood as a machine, 
and analyzing its parts would aid in understanding the whole (Checkland, 2005; Jorg, 
2011; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997).  It also rejects the deterministic, ordered, linear, 
mechanistic, analytic approach that prescribes a solution based on that premise that once 
a problem is identified (and described by its parts), it can then be solved by reducing the 
problem to its individual parts.  By examining those parts, analytic findings will apply 
back to the initial problem (Checkland, 2005; Hajer, 2006; Jorg, 2011; Prigogine & 
Stengers, 1997).   
The literature review demonstrates the transdiciplinary use of complexity theory 
across a range of disciplines. Prigogine and Stengers (1997) argued that complexity is 
distinguished by its absence of a temporal framework, whereby evolution and changes in 
the behaviors of the parts are not considered as these parts.  Individually reduced aspects 
of the problem cannot be reduced back from their newly changed state back to their 
original form upon initial analysis therefore the “past and the future no longer play 
symmetrical roles” (p. 3).  Reductionism’s deterministic, liner, symmetrical analytic 
frameworks have been largely attributed to Sir Isaac Newton.  They give rise to a 
statement that complexity theory is a rejection of Newtonian paradigm (Checkland, 2005; 
Marion, 1999; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997; Waldrop, 1994).  Prigogine and Stengers 
argued instead for a complexity analytic approach advancing the idea that analysis of 
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events that considers that a “future [is] no longer determined by the present, and the 
symmetry between past and future is broken” (p. 6).   
Its significance relates to the issue of how new emergent forms are generated 
from change within complexity theory.  Prigogine and Stengers (1997) added the concept 
of irreversibility (or the ability to reduce to its prior form), stating, “Irreversibility leads 
to a host of novel phenomena.  Figuratively speaking, matter at equilibrium, with no 
arrow of time, is ‘blind,’ but with the arrow of time, it begins to ‘see’” (p. 3).     
Marion (1999), whose work can be found within the field of management and 
organizational sciences, also addressed the challenges of how to conceptualize and frame 
the basic understanding of management.  Marion (1999) found that although theories and 
the models developed to explain a behavior is useful for the development of some 
variable analysis, it does not serve to describe reality well.  He argued that models 
generated from theories were only as good as the perspective used to generate the version 
of reality that one perceived, and that “model building is a lot like the folk tale of three 
blind men describing an elephant” (p. 11).  Each blind man touches a part of the elephant 
and generates different descriptions of the elephant.  Marion further argued that the case 
is often made that since the elephant is so large it must be divided into its constituent 
parts, yet this is “problematic because they do not impart a full sense of elephant, and the 
blind scientists will inevitably be bothered by the lack of connection among the theories” 
(p. 12).   
Marion (1999) also referred to the analytic process as the “garbage can model” of 
analysis, a term used to describe how “humans make decisions randomly,” focusing on 
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the solutions prior to a clear determination of what the issues were in advance.  Kingdon 
(2011), whose work can be found with the field of political science and public policy, 
applied a “garbage can model” analogy to the policymaking process, describing how 
disconnected policy efforts occur when problems, solutions, participants, and 
opportunities unfold independent of each other.  Kingdom (2011) suggested that decision 
makers drift in and out of the issues.  Kingdon concluded that the policymaking process 
is described as a more haphazard occurrence of events via rational planned activity. 
These perspectives can be found within the literature whereby a complexity-
informed view of how things work is described by terms such as complex systems at the 
edge of chaos (Bay-Yam, 2004; Fuchs, 2002; Holland, 2000; Kauffman, 2010; Prigogine 
and Stengers, 1997; Waldrop, 1994). Prigogine and Stengers (1997) argued that “classical 
science” provides a framework for analysis that focuses on order and stability. However, 
“in contrast, we see fluctuations, instability, multiple choices, and limited predictability at 
all levels of observation” (p. 4).  Kauffman (2010) is a theoretical biologist focused on 
observations drawn from the biological sciences and complexity theory applications and 
insights. He argued, “Late-eighteenth and early nineteenth-century biology was faced 
with the concept of fixed, unchanging species” (p. 4).  Kauffman expanded on this 
problem, arguing that biologists rejected the linear, ordered approaches to science that 
were shaped and influenced by Newton’s ordered rational approach to evolution.   
The emerging science of complexity and research on this topic can also be traced 
back to the work at the Santa Fe Institute (SFI).  The Santa Fe Institute advances the 
study of complexity within a multidisciplinary environment.  Many SFI founders are and 
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were physicists, including Nobel Prize winner Gell-Mann (2003), who won the prize for 
his work in physics and work on the theory of elementary particles.  Gell-Mann (2003) 
argued that by bringing together “in a new way material from a great number of different 
fields in physical, biological, and behavioral sciences and even in the arts and 
humanities” can broaden the knowledge base for complexity and how to understand 
complexity and apply such knowledge to new and emerging issues for study (p. ix).   
It is also relevant to look to other sources of support to demonstrate the 
connective or linked characteristics of seemingly unrelated academic disciplines.  For 
example, Gell-Mann (2003) argued “the preservation of biological diversity is 
inseparable from concern about the future of the biosphere as a whole.” (p. 345)   Gell-
Mann (2003)  added, “People must therefore get away from the idea that serious work is 
restricted to beating to death a well-defined problem in a narrow discipline” (p. 346).  
Kuhn (2009) supported this reasoning, arguing an awareness of new changes (for 
example, in a social system) or anomalies within an already preconceived understanding 
of how things should work or function are often overlooked due to entrenched theoretical 
frameworks that disallow for new paradigms or analytic methods used to explore and 
observe new changes within a research topic.    
Jorg (2011), sharply critical of the current state of the behavioral and social 
sciences with regard to how our complex social issues are framed and analyzed, argued 
against linear thinking.  He advanced the necessity to “think in terms of possibilities: that 
is, of coming into existence, of realizing the living of systems with the hitherto unknown 
generative spaces of the possible” (p. 254).  Bertanlanffy (2001), a biologist, reflected 
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these same concerns.  He reflected on how one could come to blame and relate actions 
that have not yielded the desired results as a consequence of linear thinking.  Bertanlanffy 
(2001) argued, “Earlier periods of history may have consoled themselves by blaming 
atrocities and stupidities on bad kings, wicked dictators, ignorance, superstition, material 
want and related factors,” but those days are long gone (p. 8).  Relevant factors to 
consider when attempting to understand unintended outcomes or simply bad outcomes 
should be understood through other factors that shape social-cultural systems such as, 
“prejudices, ideologies, pressure groups, social trends, growth and decay of civilizations, 
or what not” (p. 8).   
The literature supports the claim that Newtonian science introduced a linear 
perspective which is grounded on a reductionist, deterministic and objective approach 
that focuses on the assumption that an orderly clockwork-like set of processes would 
yield insights into how something could be understood.  To use the clockwork metaphor, 
systems are more machine like, rending ordered logical results, yet lending little to the 
understanding of complex issues whereby individual agents act in way wholly 
unpredictable ways (Bousquet & Curtis, 2011; Cilliers, 2002; Checkland, 2005; Geyer & 
Rihani, 2010; Holland, 2000; Jorg, 2011; Morçöl, 2012).   
Complexity and Public Policy 
Complexity theory and its application in the field of public policy analysis and 
decision making is growing, but the body of literature is small, and much of the literature 
is focused on emerging methods of analysis towards the issues rather than development 
methods for the policy.  
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 A small group of scholars (e.g., Dennard et al., 2008) is advancing new and 
emergent tools and methods embracing complexity and complexity theory in public 
policy.  Dennard et al. (2008) suggested policymakers need more studies to advance 
complexity-theoretic applications that account for such complexities.  A diverse range of 
public policy scholars contributed to the literature on why and how to apply complexity 
theory to public administration.  This is supported by Mischen and Jackson (2008), who 
argued that policy implementation is a reflection of both an appreciation of the socially 
networked constructs within the policy environment and the complexity of the policy 
issues.   
The characteristics of concepts within CT, while not exhaustive, include 
nonlinear, dynamic, co-evolutionary, feedback loops, tipping points, self-organizing, 
interrelated, and irreversible (Axelrod & Cohen, 2000; Barabasi, 2003; Checkland, 2005;  
Dennard et al., 2008; Gell-Mann, 2003; Prigogine & Stengers, 1997; Stacey, 2007; 
Waldrop, 1994).  These terms have become increasingly incorporated into the field of 
public policy studies and are important for policy analyst to consider in policy analysis 
efforts.  
Bar-Yam (2004), a physicist and systems scientist scholar in the field of dynamic 
complex systems, multiscale variation and adaptation in warfare, also has contributed to 
the literature on how to solve societal problems. Bar-Yam (2004) stated, “Everything we 
do and everything that works and doesn’t work around us is embedded in the complex 
system of our social context and our society” (p. 10).  Bar-Yam (2004) “developed an 
approach to understanding complex systems based on a few fundamental ideas:   
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1. The mechanisms of collective behavior (patterns). 
2. A multiscale perspective (the way different observers describe a systems). 
3. The evolutionary process that creates complex systems.  
4. The nature of purposive or goal-directed behavior. (p. 16)   
Bar-Yam’s (2004) studies addressed characteristics of warfare and applications of 
complexity theory to the social sciences and policymakers.  Bar-Yam’s (2004) work on 
wars and the military solutions often applied to wars and societal conflicts.  In his 
analysis of how to think in complex systems terms and warfare, Bar-Yam (2004) drew 
distinctions in warfare methods, whereby a direct force-on-force confrontation of relative 
size and scale could foretell an outcome and the associated strategy and policy could be 
synthesized into one.  Bar-Yam (2004) argued that complex wars will not allow for such 
thinking, nor does a study of social behavior suggest a reductionist approach would work 
to solve societal concerns and conflicts absent consideration of the multiple and diverse 
systems in play in a conflict or complex environment.   
Bar-Yam (2004) argued instead that warfare must be understood through the lens 
of complexity as emergent forms of warfare may include a battlefield that can be fought 
in a virtual cyber space, or found within political and social and belief systems cannot be 
understood through reductionist analytic tradecraft approaches.   
Wallerstein (2001) also acknowledged that an alternative way of thinking should 
be adopted when it comes to warfare or antisystemic movements, stating, “There has 
been uprising after uprising, mobilization after mobilization, victory after victory of 
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antisystemic movements for the whole of the twentieth century” (p. 27).  Yet Wallerstein 
suggested that systems thinking acknowledges that antisystemic movements “are 
themselves institutional products of the capitalist world-economy, formed in the crucible 
of its contradictions, permeated by its metaphysical presuppositions, constrained by the 
working of its other institutions” (p. 27).  In this case, Wallerstein (2001) is suggesting 
that is it the policies themselves that have created both a dependent and independent 
relationship that produces such systems movements.  
Complex Environments 
Broadly, there is a growing recognition that the principles of complex systems 
may help to aid in understanding complex environments.  As discussed earlier, although 
there is no single definition of a complex environment, one was the conflict in 
Afghanistan in 2009.  The ISAF Commander, General McChrystal, argued that the 
conflict was “uniquely complex” and suggested that a successful outcome would be the 
result of how well U.S. policy and strategy were able to respond to such a complex 
problem (McChrystal, 2009, p. 3).  Afghanistan and Pakistan represent an amalgamation 
of competing patronage ethnic groups, diverse political goals from among the players 
within the environment, varied international involvement with varied coalition 
capabilities to assist along with dissimilar priorities. The two countries present an 
interrelated set of social constructs embedded in economic and social dynamics with ties 
to a global narcotic system, insurgent activities, complex social networks tied into local 
corruption and state governance, and diverse ideological and belief systems--all forming 
a complex environment (Caldwell, 2011; McChrystal, 2009). 
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An additional perspective on complex environments is found in Hall and 
Citrenbaum (2010), specifically, their research on advanced analytic tradecraft skills in 
intelligence analysis for complex environments. Hall and Citrenbaum researched analytic 
methodologies and discussed how to think about complex warfare environments. This 
body of literature is relevant to analysts in the field of intelligence studies; however its 
contribution to the discussion of how to think about complex environments and warfare is 
applicable to the broader body of public policy and policy development.  Hall and 
Citrenbaum (2010) argued:  
 Those of us who have engaged in the function of “analysis” – working to 
determine the nature and imminence of threats to our nation and to our forces and 
capabilities that go in harm’s way – know that the quality of thought and the 
application of sound reasoning applied to the complex and dynamic conditions we 
encounter are the most important variables in the work of describing, 
characterizing, anticipating, and forecasting what has happened and will happen 
next. (p. vii)   
Policy Models: Process and Theories 
This literature review includes a review of policy models advanced within the 
field of public policy as they relate to the development and analysis of public policy.  
There are very few bodies of work on how to develop a public policy while viewed 
through the lens of complexity theory and almost no literature on how to analyze a policy 
using PA with the noted exception of Wallis (2010c; 2011; 2013). With this stated, the 
public policy process itself (policy models), within the field of public policy and 
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administration, were considered, to include research from Lindblom (2010), Anderson 
(2003), Dunn, 2011;  Baumgartner  & Jones, (2009); and Sabatier, (2007) and Kingdon, 
(2011).  It is important to note, however, that none of these authors presented a method 
for how to analyze a policy itself.  This did not negate the requirement to review the 
literature within the field of public policy for tools and applications within the field of 
public policy that might be amenable to this study.   
In one seminal work, Sabatier (2007) compiled an assessment of several models 
that capture the complexity of the policy process, provided rational for why it is 
important to understand the pros and cons of each model, and suggested insights into the 
policy theories varying theoretical perspectives.  They are as follows:  the stages 
heuristic, international rational choice, multiple streams, punctuated-equilibrium 
framework, the advocacy coalition framework, the policy diffusion framework, and the 
funnel of causality and other frameworks in large-n comparative studies.  Each model 
suggests that while the public policymaking process is messy, as Lindblom (2010) noted, 
a policy method of “muddling through” and Kingdon’s (2011) “policy soup” analogy 
demonstrated.  One policy model is expanded below in order to highlight how the models 
considered by Sabatier (2007) yielded little insight into how complexity and the 
theoretical underpinnings of complexity theory serve the policymaking process.  Sabatier 
(2007), critical of the policy model, termed stages heuristic, argued the model is overly 
simplistic, and the stages of “agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, 
implementation, and evaluation” approach a “top-down bias” neglecting the interrelated 
cycles of the policy process (pp. 6-7).  Sabatier argued, “The stages heuristic has outlived 
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its usefulness and needs to be replaced with better theoretical frameworks” (p. 7) and 
suggested that that “scientists should be aware of, and capable of applying, several 
different theoretical perspectives” (p. 6).  
To recap, a review of the literature yielded no insights into how to analyze the text 
of a policy within a framework or paradigm of PA, except for Wallis (2011).  Critics of 
the policy models cited a need for a more instructive approach to policymaking (Sabatier, 
2007) because these approaches no longer meet the needs of contemporary policy issues 
(John, 2003).  
This literature review also considered how the term policy was used.  Cochran 
(2012) stated that the term public policy itself “refers to a set of actions by the 
government that includes, but is not limited to, making laws and is defined in terms of a 
common goal or purpose” (p. 1).  Dunn (2011) described policy as a process “of 
multidisciplinary inquiry, policy analysis seeks to create, transform, and communicate 
knowledge about and in the policy-making process (p. 33).  Dunn (2004) added that 
“policy-relevant knowledge was ultimately judged according to its success (or failure) in 
shaping better policies, not simply because special methods were used to produce it” (p. 
35).  Kingdon (2011) argued that within the policy process, it is the analysis of the 
knowledge brought to bear on the problem, which results in a policy.  According to 
Wallis (2013), “Policies (policy models) are an important type of conceptual system 
because they help us to understand the complex and systemic world in which we live and 
work” (p. 3). Smith and Larimer (2009) suggested “multiple actors will tend to view a 
particular policy through multiple lenses” (p.42).  
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Rhodes (2008) suggested that policymakers are finding it increasing difficult to 
formulate effective policy and link theory to application.  The literature suggests that 
multiple public policy models for how the policymaking process works as well as an 
understanding of theoretical underpinnings are sometimes absent.  Denhardt (2011) 
suggested that while there has been a disconnect between theory and practice within the 
realm of public policy:  
A theory is not simply an arrangement of facts or values but a thoughtful 
reconstruction of the way we see ourselves and the world around us.  It is a way 
of making sense of a situation.  Theories may then be evaluated in terms of their 
capacity to help us see our world more clearly and to act more effectively in that 
world (p. 10).   
Policy analysts benefit from an ability to understand the policy environment 
through the deliberate theorizing about the complex environment within which the issue 
resides (Dennard et al., 2008, 2011; Miller, 2002; Morçöl, 2012).  However, while social 
and behavioral scientists have put forth considerable time and resources in analyzing 
public policy, applying new and emerging theoretical frameworks in the field of social 
sciences has been met with some resistance.  Moreover, theoretical underpinnings 
derived from complexity theory are remarkably absent (Jorg, 2011).   
Critics of ways in which the behavioral and social sciences have been traditionally 
approached also exist.  Jorg (2011) argued there was a crisis in the field of the behavioral 
and social sciences.  Specifically, Jorg concluded social scientists need to “recognize the 
hidden agenda of these sciences, and see how they operate in our society at large, with 
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the blind alleys and blind spots, fostered by the blinding of paradigms ‘in use’ by 
scientists” (p. 39).  Against a backdrop of some criticism vis-à-vis how theoretical 
frameworks have been applied within the field of the behavioral and social sciences and 
policy analysis, complexity theory has been suggested as a useful theoretical framework 
to examine policy issues (Dennard et al., 2008; Jorg, 2011; Morçöl, 2012).  The thematic 
assessment from among these authors is that there are many policy models on how the 
policy process works.  However, methods and tools to help develop public policy focused 
on the text of the public policy using a complexity-ground approach remain elusive. 
There are few practical applications grounded in complexity-theoretic principals, such as 
the emerging PA paradigm offered by Wallis (2011).   
Afghanistan and Pakistan as a Complex Adaptive System 
The final portion of this literature review is focused on the conflict in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan and how it was characterized leading up to the late 2009 Obama 
administration policy.  Expanding on the topic of what is a complex environment, on 
May 3, 2011, Jones and Rand (2011) testified before the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism and Intelligence, Committee on Homeland Security Foreign Affairs  
A current understanding of the threat to the U.S. homeland from Pakistan requires 
a nuanced appreciation of al Qa’ida and its allies.  With a leadership structure still 
in Pakistan, al Qa’ida is a notably different organization than a decade ago and 
can perhaps best be described as a “complex adaptive system.”  (p. 1)  
CAS was introduced in Chapter 1 and it remains important to consider that policy 
experts reinforced the theme that the AfPak situation was poorly understood.  Significant 
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to this literature review is the recurring theme that policymakers, and strategists, need to 
better understand how to conceptualize the policy issue (Caldwell, 2011).  
The 2009 U.S. Obama Administration Policy Review Toward Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 
 In mid-2009, following a considered review of the issues of the Afghanistan 
conflict, President Obama (2009) presented his administration’s policy regarding the 
conflict (Obama, 2009).  To address the issues facing the nation with regard to 
Afghanistan in March 2009, the White House issued a policy statement calling for the 
United States, in part, “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future” (“White Paper,” 
n.d., p. 1).  In order to reach the policy goals, the president asked for another re-
assessment.  General McChrystal, Commander, International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces Afghanistan in 2009, proved to be a significant 
contributor to the president’s assessment, calling the conflict in Afghanistan a “uniquely 
complex environment” (McChrystal, 2009a).  His challenge from the president was to 
gain an understanding of the conflict environment, provide an assessment, and execute a 
strategy based on the policy goals put forth by the Obama administration (Obama, 2009).   
General McChrystal’s (2009b) assessment included a key finding that described the 
conflict as it relates to how to understand causal relationships within the complex 
environment.  He argued 
The conflict in Afghanistan can be viewed as a set of related insurgencies, each of 
which is a complex system with multiple actors and a vast set of interconnecting 
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relationships among those actors. The most important implication of this view is 
that no element of the conflict can be viewed in isolation - a change anywhere 
will affect everything else. This view implies that the system must be understood 
holistically, and while such understanding is not predictive, it will help to 
recognize general causal relationships (McChrystal, 2009b, Nature of the 
Conflict, papa. 1). 
From the literature review emerged select testimonies, books, and documents that 
described the central tenets or characteristics of the policy issue. The central tenet that 
emerged within the literature addressing characteristics within the policy issue is best 
summarized with the 2009 Obama administration policy review that there were 
inextricably linked actors shaping the security environment (“White Paper,” n.d., p. 1).  
The principle goals of the administrations’ policy were to devise goals to address 
1. Terror networks spanning both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
2. Promotion of a more capable government in Afghanistan. 
3. Development of increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces. 
4. Enhancement of Pakistan support via economic measures. 
5. United Nations and international community involvement.  (Obama, 2009) 
Caldwell (2011) suggested that policy analysts must consider that the al-Qaeda 
problem in the AfPak conflict is central to the policy statements. It has been described as 
a CAS with an informal global network of actors nested within larger systems that shape 
the environment (Bousquet, 2011; Kilcullen, 2005, 2011).  Beyond al-Qaeda having 
physical presence in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the literature also identified broader 
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characteristics within the policy environment.  The larger informal and formal networks 
of global factors, variables, actors, policy systems, other social systems, and belief 
systems are assessed to contribute to the CAS descriptor.  
Lia (2009) described perspectives from the adversary and how the adversary 
addresses complexity and complex adaptive systems. Lia focused on the theoretical 
framework, doctrine, and strategies advanced by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, one of al-Qaeda’s 
more prolific writers.  Lia documented the global reach of al-Suri’s writings, highlighting 
highlighted how Abu Mus’ab al-Suri advocated for and taught that a global jihad should 
be decentralized in nature.  Lia documented how al Qaeda adopted a systems approach 
within its jihad doctrine to serve as its theoretic framework.  The research from his 
studies showed that al Qaeda strategists were teaching systems behavior as a way to 
combat and counter outside efforts to disrupt the group.  Lia’s (2009) research 
documented that a central theoretic framework emerging from al-Suri’s writing can be 
found directly from al-Suri’s slogan, stating al Qaeda is “a system of action: not a secret 
organization for action’: nizam al-‘amal, wa laysa tanzim lil-‘amal” (p. 440).    
Summary 
After reviewing the literature, it is apparent that existing scholars, practitioners, 
and researchers have identified the relationship to complexity theory, its ability to inform 
the characterization of how the complex policy environment works, how useful 
complexity theory is to the public policy community, and how emergent methodologies 
to conduct policy analysis could be performed.  The literature review also demonstrated 
how the body of work on complexity theory has become a more transdisciplinary 
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endeavor, yet its applications to public policy are still somewhat stratified (Jorg, 2011).  
This is understandable given the wide range of academic disciplines that often embrace 
unique or preferred methods of analysis.  Complexity theory, with its origins in physics 
and biology, has been not been well integrated into the field of social sciences, but it is 
making strides.   
The literature reviewed and synthesized key works reflecting a relationship to 
policy analysis and new ways to explore research methods in this arena.  
Finally, with regard to the topic of complexity and how our adversaries operate 
within a complex environment, the literature reviewed and synthesized key works 
reference those attempting to wage a global jihad who have adopted a systems approach 
to how they intend to wage their jihad, namely al-Qaeda.  More specifically, one of the 
primary issues addressed in the 2009 Obama administration policy, the al-Qaeda 
phenomena itself, has been described as a CAS (Bousquet, 2011; Kilkullen, 2005; 
Marion & Uhl-Bein, 2003).  This is key for policymakers considering dynamic and 
emergent behaviors of terrorist and insurgent groups and the complex operational 
environments wherein such conflict resides and requires a keen appreciation of a wide 
range of factors that will contribute to the conflict of today and into our future. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
This chapter begins with the rationale for utilizing the integrated mixed-method 
single-case study research design.  It then describes the reasons for selecting the policy.  
This is followed by my description of the process for data collection and analysis.  
Finally, in this chapter, I describe my preliminary approach for how I describe the 
findings in Chapter 4.   The approval to conduct this study was provided by the 
University and the following number references this approval:  # 06-03-14-0052106. 
 
Research Design and Approach 
Design      
This study used an integrated mixed-methods case study approach, within the 
mixed-methods research paradigm.  Yin (1994) described a case study as a method of 
inquiry that “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (p. 13).  This study gathered data from a range of sources.  It specifically 
reviewed data that related to assessments that were publicly submitted for use in 
consideration of the Obama administration December 1, 2009, policy.  No interviews, 
surveys, or other forms of personal contact were conducted.   
The integrated mixed-methods study of research design serves to describe both 
the research strategy and the object of the study.  It remains important to underscore here 
that the PA paradigm is at once both the subject and study of inquiry and is integral to the 
methodology used in this study.  Propositional analysis itself is described as a mixed-
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methods research design by the developer of this analytic approach (Wallis, 2011).  
Therefore, assessments of other methodologies for a portion of the research design on the 
policy itself, while considered, were not included because it is the PA method that 
informs the PA paradigm (thus the mode of policy analysis) that informed the research 
design.     
Four quality control indicators were included in the research design, as suggested 
by Yin (2004, p. 33): Construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability. 
To achieve construct validity, multiple data sources were included and collected 
in a manner reflecting the multiple ranges of themes and topics. Yin (1994) argued that 
data collected must be well documented to establish a “chain of evidence” (p. 34).  
External validity, which refers to a study’s generalizability, was addressed in two ways.  
The study expands on previous studies that used the PA method and replicated their 
results.  This was accomplished through the data analysis process and documenting the 
findings.  Finally, Wallis (2011) argued policymakers, researchers, and analysts working 
on policy issues have an ethical responsibility to explore new methods of policy analysis 
in order to better understand how to develop better policy.  The PA method facilitates 
responsible research following clear steps that scholars and practitioners can use to 
advance knowledge on this important subject of research.  
Alternative Methods Considered for a Research Design 
The research design process for this study considered several methodologies. 
Quantitative methods were considered, in part, because the PA methodology itself has a 
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quantitative component.  However, the research data and the study’s more hermeneutic, 
heuristic, and interpretive components suggested that a qualitative approach would yield 
thick interpretive findings (Bryman, 2011).  Further, quantitative approaches tend to be 
derived from the positivist paradigm (i.e., the epistemological orientation) and the realist 
ontological orientation (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).  The research question itself 
suggests learning through heuristic and exploration processes.  This orientation towards 
research tend to be derived from the postpositivist paradigm and is in keeping with the 
complexity theory and PA paradigm.  This suggestion focused the research design search 
to qualitative methods, ultimately resting on a terming this study a mixed-methods 
approach incorporating both quantitative and qualitative approaches as it was suggested 
by Wallis (2011).  This method was employed, despite some literature that suggested 
some contention over the value of qualitative studies in general, and case study methods 
specifically (Creswell, 2009; Yin, 1994).   
Nonetheless, when considering this study’s research design complexity as a 
phenomenon, the term used to describe the complex environment that was/is the 
Afghanistan and Pakistan conflict and policy propositions were considered.  Creswell 
(2008) argued, “The research design process in qualitative research begins with 
philosophical assumptions that the inquirers make in deciding to undertake a qualitative 
study” (p. 15).  The philosophical assumption for this study is that complexity and 
systems theory provides insights into how to understand and make sense of our world. 
The research questions drove the decision for the case study; however, other forms of 
research designs were considered.   
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The narrative research design approach considers the data derived from the 
interpretations, representations, and observations from those whose perspectives about an 
observed phenomenon are shared perhaps, as an example, through interviews or 
documents (Creswell, 2008, 2011; Miller & Salkind, 2002; Yin, 2011).  The storyteller is 
the primary focus in a narrative research design (Creswell, 2008; Miller & Salkind, 2002; 
Yin, 2011).  While rich, contextual data relayed in stories by those on the ground in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan likely informed the policy review process, typical narrative 
studies are inherently limited to one or two persons.  This study does consider the 
narrative (the storytelling) as a conceptual strategy for sensemaking.  This study also 
relied on available assessments of the policy environment.  Policymakers consider the 
observations of those on the ground, as in the case of official testimony provided to 
Congress; therefore, there is a narrative element to the research.  However, for this study, 
it is the intersection of complexity theoretic methods and the PA method of policy 
analysis, using the specific text of the policy under exploration and of interest to the 
researcher.   
Phenomenology suggests the object of study is related to the descriptions of 
experiences that people in cultural or organizational settings relay (Merriam, 2009).  This 
is often done through survey questions.  The distinction between the narrative design 
approach and the phenomenology approach is nuanced.  The narrative approach suggests 
that the storyteller or the narrator details rich contextual knowledge, as seen through one 
or two storytellers.  The phenomenology approach captures the experiences as they were 
gained in their own natural setting (Merriam, 2009).  Neither approach proved useful for 
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this case study’s analysis, partially because the information used to develop the policy 
addressed in this study is largely derived from official documents known to be part of the 
Obama administrations review of the Afghanistan and Pakistan issue. 
Data Collection 
The PA Methodology 
I obtained a letter of acknowledgment from Dr. Steven Wallis citing his approval 
to use his developed PA methodology.   
The December 1, 2009, Obama Administration AfPak policy was the policy that 
was analyzed.  It is a published and posted document and is included in the appendix.    
Preliminary Data Analysis Process 
Three analytic processes were conducted:   
1.   Purposefully selected the Obama administration Dec 1, 2009, policy as the 
policy to be used. The specific steps for PA are described below. 
a. Identified a specific policy text. 
b. Identified all causal propositions within the text (preferably a specific 
policy model or similar concise, yet authoritative, representation of the 
policy). 
c. Linked propositions according to related aspects. 
d. Quantified the total number of aspects to find the complexity. 
e. Identified and quantify the concatenated aspects. 
f. Divided the number of concatenated aspects by the total number of 
aspects to find the Robustness/systemicity (a ratio between zero and 
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one).  (Wallis, 2010, pp. 32-33)  
g. The first six steps describe the methodology of propositional analysis 
(PA), whereby the structure of the policy is analyzed “to objectively 
determine its complexity and formal robustness/systemicity” (Wallis, 
2010b, p. 153).  Wallis described how complexity is determined “by 
quantifying the concepts and connections within” each policy 
statement (p. 153).  The robustness/systemicity of the policy is “a 
measure of its internal integrity, based on the ratio between the total 
number of aspects and the number of concatenated aspects” (p. 153).   
2.   Employed a systematic search for relevant documents, using multiple 
sources of evidence that helped develop a rich descriptive study to describe 
how complexity and propositional analysis support effective policymaking.  
This process, referred to as the process of triangulation for this particular 
study (which includes the variety of data sources, the diversity of sources 
that contributed to the Obama 2009 AfPak policy review, and the use of 
both the PA method and the exploratory case study) defines the integrated 
mixed-methods single-case study approach.  Data collection (the policy) 
was derived from publically available documents that can be reviewed 
repeatedly.  A chain of evidence was maintained to further establish the 
reliability of the sources used within this study (Yin, 2011).   
3.   The analytic strategy comprised several analysis techniques.  The theoretical 
propositions and orientation of complexity theory guided the effort.  The 
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proposition that complexity and systems are a natural part of the policy 
environment informed the organization of the data.  The other technique 
used comprised a descriptive approach to explain or describe the 
phenomenon that has come to be described as the AfPak policy issue.   
The triangulation process within this research design was used to explore the validity of 
the PA paradigm.  This descriptive process of assessing the empirical research methods 
of the PA paradigm was provided in the analytical conclusions found in chapter 5.    
 Much of the overall study is recursive and circular (Maxwell, 2005).  Maxwell 
(2005) argued that “qualitative research design is recursive and circular and not 
sequential and linear.  It involves cycles of reflection and refinement” (p. 2).  Maxwell 
(2005) referred to this research process as “tacking,” whereby the study consists of many 
processes that are more reflexive in nature “assessing the implications of goals, theories, 
research questions, methods and validity threats for one another” (p. 3).  Here Maxwell 
stressed that qualitative research is an interactive process absent a more stringent set of 
steps.  Maxwell argued that the qualitative research design defines a study whereby the 
“components of the study interact with one another” much like real world complexity 
behaves as a system with interrelated and changing characteristics forming the whole of 
the environment.  In this study, the analytical conclusions in chapter four and the findings 
in chapter five reflect the “tacking process” that took place whereby both the policy was 
analyzed and assessments were made as to the heuristic value of the PA paradigm.  
The research design aimed to be instructive in two ways.  It was intended to 
provide insight into the emergent intellectual tools necessary to help policymakers 
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understand, identify, and specify public policy problems.  It helped to develop policies 
that better serve the changes desired.  This study also intended to provide insights into 
how social changes can be made positive by being able to better understand how to craft 
policy in such a way as to consider and provide foresight into future outcomes (Lawson, 
2013).  A policymaker must endeavor to understand the policy issue’s depth and breadth, 
as without this understanding, poorly developed policies could be made which, over time, 
could be nearly impossible to change.  In the context of a complex conflict environment, 
poorly developed policy can lead to an incalculable loss of lives and resources.  The first 
step toward saving lives is to determine the complex and nonlinear nature of the policy.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter presents the results of the policy analysis that made up the focus of 
this study.  The following abstract example from Wallis (2011) is meant to orient the 
reader to the policy analysis process.  Wallis (2011) accepts that propositions could 
contain more than one type of a logic structure.  They include atomistic, linear, circular 
and concatenated logics.  Below is an example of a proposition and how the methodology 
will work, as follows: 
A is true, B is true: more A causes more C; more B causes more D; more D and 
more C cause more E.  In such a model, there are five aspects (A, B, C, D, and E).  
Therefore the Complexity of the policy is C = 5.  Of those five, only E is 
concatenated (increases in D and increases in C cause increases in E).  This 
allows us to find the ratio of well-understood aspects to poorly understood aspects 
of R = 0.20 (the results of one concatenated aspect divided by five total aspects).  
(p. 33)    
Wallis (2011) noted that his previous studies using PA his research suggested that 
the robustness/systemicity of the policy provides “some indicators” of a policy’s 
effectiveness (p. 33).  As Wallis (2013) continued to refine his research into the heuristic 
value of PA, he suggested that more policies should be analyzed using this approach in 
order to add to the body of knowledge for those seeking to learn more from the 
applications of complexity-based approaches to policy analysis.  This study picks up on 
the recommendation for more research.   
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This study used Propositional Analysis to analyze the US foreign policy 
articulated in the “Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the Way 
Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan” speech delivered December 1, 2009 (Obama, 
2009).  This speech announced a major new policy of the U.S. Obama administration that 
reflected a new way forward for the administration and, perhaps more importantly, that it 
would address Afghanistan and Pakistan as separate sovereign states, but together would 
be considered as one overarching complex challenge (Obama, 2009).  The president’s 
policy included a key focus for the United States to “set a goal that was narrowly defined 
as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to 
better coordinate our military and civilian efforts (Obama, 2009, para. 10).   
Succinctly, the PA paradigm is used to provide an understanding of what can be 
learned when developing a public policy.  Still, newer policies can signal changes in the 
environment. By utilizing the PA method as a systems-based method of analysis, new 
insights into how to develop and understand the policy environment can enhance the 
effectiveness of the policies (Wallis, 2014).  
Applying the Propositional Analysis Method 
The propositional analysis used to examine the 2009 Obama administration policy 
followed a six-step approach. Each step of the methodology and subsequent policy is 
graphically depicted in a figure followed by a listing of the analytical conclusions and an 
aggregate of the analytic conclusions President Obama’s AfPak policy expressed in the 
analyzed speech can be divided roughly into three primary policy goals.  Each goal is 
supported by propositions within the policy reflecting input from the 2009 policy review 
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process, and is a series of propositions about how the environment is understood and how 
it is expected to change.  Each of the three primary policy goals consists of a set of 
interrelated propositions that are amenable to the use of the PA method (Wallis, 2011).   
For example, the policy states that disrupting terrorists’ networks in Afghanistan 
and Pakistan will degrade the terrorists’ ability to plan and conduct attacks abroad.  The 
PA method suggests that the model developed from an analysis of the propositions and 
concepts provides a conceptual frame for how the complex environment wherein the 
policy issue resides is understood.  The PA method suggests that a policymaker will have 
an improved understanding of the complex environment and the systems “through 
diagramming, identifying structures of logic, finding formal measure of Complexity, and 
finding formal measure of robustness/systemicity (which indicates the potential 
usefulness of that conceptual system)” (Wallis, 2014, p. 7). 
The analysis began with identifying the primary policy themes within the policy.  
The text of the policy is presented as it was represented originally “followed by a 
diagram of the conceptual logic model that reflects the anticipated changes and an 
analysis of the diagram” (Wallis, 2011, p. 100).  It is important to note that President 
Obama stated that “our overarching goal remains the same:  to disrupt, dismantle, and 
defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent its capacity to threaten 
America and our allies in the future” (Obama, 2009, para. 20). These goals and the 
subsequent policy analysis using PA are presented below. 
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Analysis of Policy Goal 1 
Policy goal 1 was, “We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven” (United States, 2009, 
para. 21). 
Expected change within the policy environment for goal one:  If terrorist networks 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan are denied a safe haven there will be decreased threat to 
America and our allies in the future.   
But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in 
Afghanistan has deteriorated.  After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 
2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s leadership established a safe haven there.  Although a 
legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by 
corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security 
forces.  (Obama, 2009, para. 8)  (See Figure 3.) 
To begin the analysis, some step-by-step analysis is in order to orient the 
policymaker to the PA method.  In the statement above, and in the first proposition, initial 
analysis suggests that there is an implied causal relationship.  However, in the first 
sentence of this portion of the policy (sentence 1, para. 8) there appears to be an atomistic 
logic structure, as seen in Figure 2.    
 
 
 
Figure 2. Too atomistic.  (Obama, 2009,  para. 8) 
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Wallis (2011) defined “atomistic” as a “kind of logical structure found within a 
proposition that is reductionist, such as “A is valid” or “A is true,” or more concretely, 
“Apples are important” (p. 99).   Also, recall that a circular logic, is where a change in 
one aspect to another leads back to the first, for example “More A causes more B causes 
more C causes more A) (Wallis, 2014, p.4) (see Figure 3 below).  PA suggests a causal 
relationship is “where two or more aspects are related so that a change in one causes a 
change in one or more others” (Wallis, 2011, p. 100).   
 
 
 
Figure 3. Example of Circular Logic.  
 
What might be implied is a time element, something like more time causes more 
deterioration, but this is still an inferred assumption (for example, see Figure 4 below). 
 
A
B
CD
E
More al Qaeda 
movement into 
Pakistan 
More establishment of safe haven by 
al Qaeda’s leadership 
Causes 
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Figure 4.  Example of linear logic.  (Obama, 2009, para. 8) 
 
 After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s 
leadership established a safe haven there.  (Obama, 2009, para. 8).  (See Figure 4.) 
In the statement above, an example of linear logic is apparent.  Wallis (2011) defined 
linear logic is “a logical structure found within a proportion describing simple causal 
relationship between two aspects such as more A causes more B.  Both A and B exist in a 
linear relationship to one another” (p. 101).   
To better understand how and why al Qaeda were able to establish a safe haven, 
something else needs to be added to better diagram the complexity and systemicity of the 
policy environment (i.e., needs to be concatenated).  Systems theory and complexity 
theory provide a research framework (as does this PA model) to model phenomena from 
an integrated lens.  The lens moves beyond analytic frameworks or models that are 
reductionist, linear, and present challenges to a critical inquiry of “what changes” could 
occur.  
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
“Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been 
hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient 
security forces.  (Obama, 2009, para. 8).  (See Figure 5.)  
The effects on effectiveness are more clear, and the legitimacy seems more implied (but 
reasonably so).  Putting the concepts together as they are presented within this portion of 
the policy it can be seen that there are seven concepts. 
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Figure 5.  Obama, 2009, para. 8. 
As shown in Figure 5, where each box represents one concept,  it may be seen that 
there are seven concepts total. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 7.  The 
darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  For this portion of the policy diagram 
it should be noted that there are two concatenated concepts (2- 7); therefore, the 
Robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of two concatenated concepts divided by seven 
total concepts).  
5.7 Less sufficient 
security forces.  
5.1 More 
elections by 
the Afghan 
people, 
 
 
 
 
 
5.5 Less drug trade 
 
5.2 More 
legitimacy of the 
government 
 
5.3 More 
effectiveness of 
the government 
5.6 Less developed 
economy 
5.4 Less 
corruption 
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The model, therefore, has a low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  The relationship between 5.2 and 5.3 however, suggests a more reasonable 
indication of complex changes based on this portion of the policy.  For Figure 5, and this 
portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest that this portion of the policy 
would be less effective in practical application.  For a policymaker, each of the systems 
or concepts is an opportunity for more research.  It could be more likely that other factors 
or behaviors in systems not considered, such as belief systems or economic systems, 
could impact the other already cited causal factors, creating more changes in the future 
complex environment.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
Yet huge challenges remain.  Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has 
moved backwards.  There's no imminent threat of the government being 
overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum.  Al Qaeda has not reemerged 
in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe 
havens along the border.  And our forces lack the full support they need to 
effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the 
population.  Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has 
reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated.  In 
short:  The status quo is not sustainable.  (Obama, 2009, para. 12)  (See Figure 6.) 
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Figure 6.  Obama, 2009, para. 12. 
This diagram suggests government security is better understood than the security 
of the population.  Also, in the portion of the policy diagram there are two 
atomistic diagrams.  From Figure 6, where each box represents one concept, it 
may be seen that there are eight concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure 
is C = 8.  There are no darker dashed boxes as there are no concateanteded 
concepts.  So, it may be seen that there are zero concatenated concepts (0 - 8),  
and the robustness/systemicity is 0.0 (the result of no concatenated concepts 
divided by eight total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and robustness 
/systemicity score, or denoting the overall systemicity, a low systemicity score.  For 
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Figure 6, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
If policymakers were to take from this finding that the complex environment and 
its complexity needed to be considered further, they could include more concepts, thus 
creating a more complex model.  Also, policymakers should consider conducting more 
analysis of the relationships and dynamic changes that occur between currently 
unconneted propositions and concepts.  For example, there may be a causal link between 
6.3 and 6.5. 
For Figure 6 there are six separate groupings of causally related concepts. To 
impove the overall coherence of the model, these six could be linked by more causal 
relationships to help the policymaker better understand the complex, dynamic, and 
interrelated nature of the environment.  For example, a policymaker should also consider 
how the currently causal relationship between the concepts might show a causal 
relationship between 6.1 and 6.3 and 6.5.  That would link the concepts together in a way 
that both explaines the relational concepts of the policy, signaling a better undertanding 
of the complexity of the environment and it would also raise concept 6.5 to a more 
complex, (concatenated) concept, thus improving the overall robutness and systemicity of 
the policy model. 
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
So, no, I do not make this decision lightly.  I make this decision because I am 
convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This is the 
epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda.  It is from here that we were 
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attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I 
speak.  This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat.  In the last few months 
alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here 
from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. 
And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can 
operate with impunity.  We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, 
we must increase the stability and capacity of our partners in the region.  (Obama, 
2009, para. 17)  (See Figure 7.) 
 
Figure 7.  Obama, 2009, para. 17. 
Each box represents one concept; thus, it may be seen there are five concepts. 
Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 5.  The darker dashed box represents a 
concateanted concept.  So, it may be seen that there is one concatenated concept (1-5); 
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pressure on al Qaeda 
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88 
 
 
therefore, the robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of one concatenated concept 
divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or refereing to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 6, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest that 
this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
If policymakers were to take from this finding, they would conclude that the 
complex environment and its complexity needed to be considered further.  For example, 
there may be more causal links between 7.2 and 7.5.  A better undertanding of the 
complexity of the environment could be reflected if there were a clearer complex 
relationship reflected between 7.2 and 7. 5, thus raising concept 7.3 to a more complex, 
(concatenated) concept and improving the overall robutness and thereby the systemicity 
of the policy model. 
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that 
country.  But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of 
Pakistan.  That's why we need a strategy that works on both sides of the border.  
(Obama, 2009, para. 29).  (See Figure 8.) 
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Figure 8.  Obama, 2009, para. 29. 
Each box represents one concept; thus, it may be seen that there are four concepts. 
Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C =  4.  The darker dashed box represents a 
causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one concatenated concept (1- 4),  
therefore the Robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of one concatenated concept 
divided by four total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 8 and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest that 
this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
For Figure 8, a policymaker should consider how the currently causal relationship 
between the concepts might show a more complex relationship or a complex 
concatenated logic model between 8.2 and 8.4.  Recall, with a causal relationship, “it is 
not useful to state (for example) that ‘A and B are interrelated’ or ‘more A may cause 
more B’ because the nature of the relationship is not causally defined” (Wallis, 2011, p. 
100).  If a policymaker considered and moved beyond a cognitive framwork that focuses 
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on the “what is” and moved to the “what could be” within the dynamic complex 
environment, more concatenated or systemic propostions would link the concepts. Doing 
so would both explain the relational concepts of the policy, thus signaling a better 
undertanding of the complexity of the environment.  It would also raise concept 8.3 to a 
more complex (concatenated) concept, thus improving the overall robustness and thereby 
the systemicity of the policy model. 
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who’ve argued that the struggle 
against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or 
seeking accommodation with those who use violence.  But in recent years, as 
innocents have been killed from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it 
is the Pakistani people who are the most endangered by extremism.  Public 
opinion has turned.  The Pakistani army has waged an offensive in Swat and 
South Waziristan.  And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share 
a common enemy.  (Obama, 2009, para. 30)  (See Figure 9) 
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Figure 9.  Obama, 2009, para. 30. 
Each box represents one of four concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the 
figure is C = 4.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
concatenated concept (1- 4); therefore, the robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by four total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or a low systemicity score.  For Figure 9, and this portion of 
the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this portion of the policy is less effective in 
practical application.  
For Figure 9, a policymaker should consider how the currently causal relationship 
between the concepts might show a more complex relationship or a complex 
concatenated logic model between 9.3 and 9.4.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly.  Those 
days are over.  Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan 
that is built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. 
We will strengthen Pakistan’s capacity to target those groups that threaten our 
countries, and have made it clear that we cannot tolerate a safe haven for terrorists 
whose location is known and whose intentions are clear.  America is also 
providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and 
development.  We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis 
displaced by the fighting.  And going forward, the Pakistan people must know 
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America will remain a strong supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long 
after the guns have fallen silent, so that the great potential of its people can be 
unleashed.  (Obama, 2009, para. 31)  (See Figure 10.) 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Obama, 2009, para. 31. 
Each box represents one of seven concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the 
figure is C =  7.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There are three 
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concatenated concept (10.3, 10.6, 10.7, therefore 3 - 7).  The Robustness/systemicity is 
0.42 (the result of three concatenated concepts divided by seven total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a  low level of complexity and robustness/systemicity 
score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity score.  For Figure 10, and 
this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this portion of the policy is 
less effective in practical application.  
For Figure 10, a policymaker should consider how the currently causal 
relationship between the concepts might show a more complex relationship or a complex 
concatenated logic model between 10.3 and 10.4.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
Because this is an international effort, I’ve asked that our commitment be joined 
by contributions from our allies.  Some have already provided additional troops, 
and we're confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks 
ahead.  Our friends have fought and bled and died alongside us in 
Afghanistan.  And now, we must come together to end this war successfully.  For 
what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility -- what's at stake is the 
security of our allies, and the common security of the world.  (Obama, 2009, para. 
23)  (See Figure 11.) 
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Figure 11. Obama, 2009, para. 23.  
 Each box represents one of five concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is 
C =  5.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
concatenated concept (1- 5);  therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 10, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
For Figure 11, a policymaker should consider how the currently causal 
relationship between the concepts might show a more complex relationship or a complex 
concatenated logic model between 11.4 and 11. 2.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
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But taken together, these additional American and international troops will allow 
us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to 
begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.  Just as we 
have done in Iraq, we will execute this transition responsibly, taking into account 
conditions on the ground.  We'll continue to advise and assist Afghanistan's 
security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long haul.  But it will be 
clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan people -- 
that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.  (Obama, 2009, 
para. 24)  (See Figure 12.) 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Obama, 2009, para. 24. 
 Each box represents one of five concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is 
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C = 5.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one concatenated 
concept (1- 5); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 12, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
Now, let me be clear:  None of this will be easy.  The struggle against violent 
extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan 
and Pakistan.  It will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in 
the world.  And unlike the great power conflicts and clear lines of division that 
defined the 20th century, our effort will involve disorderly regions, failed states, 
diffuse enemies.  (Obama, 2009, para. 41).  (See Figure 13.) 
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Figure 13. Obama, 2009, para. 41.  
 Each box represents one of four concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the 
figure is C = 4.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
concatenated concept (1- 4); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by four total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 12, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end 
wars and prevent conflict -- not just how we wage wars.  We'll have to be nimble 
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and precise in our use of military power.  Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to 
establish a foothold -- whether in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere -- they must be 
confronted by growing pressure and strong partnerships.  (Obama, 2009, para. 
42)    (See Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Obama, 2009, para. 42. 
Each box represents one of five concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the figure 
is C = 5.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
concatenated concept (1- 5); therefore, the robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  The model, therefore, has a fairly 
low level of complexity and robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall 
systemicity, a low systemicity score.  For Figure 14, and this portion of the policy model 
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analysis, PA suggess that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical 
application.   
 Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
And we can’t count on military might alone.  We have to invest in our homeland 
security, because we can’t capture or kill every violent extremist abroad.  We 
have to improve and better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step 
ahead of shadowy networks.  (Obama, 2009, para. 43)    (See Figure 15). 
 
Figure 15.  Obama, 2009, para. 43. 
Each box represents one of five concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the figure 
is C = 5.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
concatenated concept (1- 5); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
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The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 15, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:  
We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction.  And that's why I've 
made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from 
terrorists, to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world 
without them -- because every nation must understand that true security will never 
come from an endless race for ever more destructive weapons; true security will 
come for those who reject them.  (Obama, 2009, para. 44)    (See Figure 16.)  
 
Figure 16.  Obama, 2009, para. 44. 
Each box represents one of five concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the figure 
is C = 5.  The darker dashed box represents a causal relationship.  There is one 
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concatenated concept (1- 5); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.2 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 16, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA suggests that this 
portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Similarily to Figure 15 and the suggestion that, once integrated into the whole 
model, the model in Figure 16 may demonstrate more robustness/systemicity than one 
integrated with Figure 15.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy:   
We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of an 
interconnected world acting alone.  I've spent this year renewing our alliances and 
forging new partnerships.  And we have forged a new beginning between 
America and the Muslim world -- one that recognizes our mutual interest in 
breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future in which those who kill 
innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and human 
dignity.”  (Obama, 2009, para. 45)  (See Figure 17.)     
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Figure 17.  Obama, 2009, para. 45. 
Each box represents one of six concepts.  Therefore, the Complexity of the figure 
is C = 6.  The darker dashed  box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that 
there is one concatenated concept (1- 6); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.16 
(the result of one concatenated concept divided by six total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 17, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy.   
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And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values -- for the challenges that 
we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not.  That's why 
we must promote our values by living them at home -- which is why I have 
prohibited torture and will close the prison at Guantanamo Bay.  And we must 
make it clear to every man, woman and child around the world who lives under 
the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their human 
rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for 
the dignity of all peoples.  That is who we are.  That is the source, the moral 
source, of America’s authority.  (Obama, 2009, para. 46)  (See Figure 18.) 
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Figure 18.  Obama, 2009, para. 46. 
From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that 
there are seven concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 7.  The darker 
dashed  box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one 
concatenated concept (1- 7); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.14 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by seven total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 18, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Analysis of Policy Goal 2 
Policy Goal 2 was, “We must reverse the Taliban’s momentum and deny it the 
ability to overthrow the government” (Obama, 2009, para. 20). 
Expected Change within the Policy Environment for goal two:  If the Taliban’s 
momentum is reversed then the Afghanistan government will not be overthrown. 
“Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al 
Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government.  Gradually, the 
Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while 
engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the 
Pakistani people.  (Obama, 2009, para. 9)  (See Figure 19). 
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Figure 19.  Obama, 2009, para. 9. 
 From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that 
there are three concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 3.  The darker 
dashed  box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one 
concatenated concept (1- 3); therefore, the robustness/systemicity is 0.3 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by three total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 19, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy.   
Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction 
of what they were in Iraq.  When I took office, we had just over 32,000 
Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the 
war.  Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the 
reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive.  And that's 
why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more 
troops.  After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy 
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recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan 
and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan.  I set a goal that was narrowly defined 
as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and 
pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts.  (Obama, 2009, para. 
10)  (See Figure 20). 
 
 
Figure 20.  Obama, 2009, para. 10. 
 From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that there 
are six concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 6.  The darker dashed  
box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one concatenated 
concept (1- 6); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.16 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by six total concepts).  
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The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 20, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first 
part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency 
and secure key population centers.  They'll increase our ability to train competent 
Afghan security forces, and to partner with them so that more Afghans can get 
into the fight.  And they will help create the conditions for the United States to 
transfer responsibility to the Afghans.  (Obama, 2009, para. 22)  (See Figure 21) 
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Figure 21.  Obama, 2009, para. 22. 
 From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that there 
are four concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 4.  The darker dashed  
box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one concatenated 
concept (1- 4); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by four total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 21, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
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Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy.   
Analysis of Policy Goal 3 
Policy Goal 3 was, “We must strengthen the capacity of Afghanistan’s security 
forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for Afghanistan’s future” 
(Obama, 2009). 
Expected Change within the Policy Environment for Goal Three:  If the capacity 
of Afghanistan’ security forces and government are strengthened then they can take the 
lead in Afghanistan’s future and American troops can come home.  
This review is now complete.  And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined 
that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to 
Afghanistan.  After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.  These are 
the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan 
capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of 
Afghanistan.  (Obama, 2009, para. 14)  (See Figure 22) 
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Figure 22.  Obama, 2009, para. 14. 
 From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that there 
are four concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 4.  The darker dashed  
box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one concatenated 
concept (1- 4); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.25 (the result of one 
concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 22, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy.   
We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those 
Taliban who abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow 
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citizens.  And we will seek a partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual 
respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to strengthen those who build; to hasten 
the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting friendship in which 
America is your partner, and never your patron.  (Obama, 2009, para. 27)  (See 
Figure 23) 
 
Figure 23.  Obama, 2009, para. 27. 
From this diagram, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that 
there are seven concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 7.  The darker 
dashed  box represents a causal relationship.  So, it may be seen that there is one 
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concatenated concept (1- 7); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0.14 (the result of 
one concatenated concept divided by five total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or referring to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
score.  For Figure 23, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.   
Moving to the next section of propositions within the policy: 
Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan 
people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can 
take advantage of improved security.  This effort must be based on 
performance.  The days of providing a blank check are over.  President Karzai's 
inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new direction.  And 
going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our 
assistance.  We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that 
combat corruption and deliver for the people.  We expect those who are 
ineffective or corrupt to be held accountable.  And we will also focus our 
assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make an immediate impact in 
the lives of the Afghan people.  (Obama, 2009, para. 25)  (See Figure 24) 
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Figure 24.  Obama, 2009, para. 25. 
From Figure 24, where each box represents one concept, it may be seen that there 
are 10 concepts. Therefore, the Complexity of the figure is C = 10.  There are no darker 
dashed  boxes representing any concateanted concepts.  So, it may be seen that there is 
zero concatenated concept (0- 10); therefore, the Robustness/systemicity is 0. (the result 
of zer concatenated concept divided by ten total concepts).  
The model, therefore, has a fairly low level of complexity and the same for the 
robustness/systemicity score, or refereing to the overall systemicity, a low systemicity 
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score.  For Figure 24, and this portion of the policy model analysis, PA would suggest 
that this portion of the policy would be less effective in practical application.  
If policymakers were to take from this finding that the complex environment and 
its complexity needed to be considered further, they could include more concepts, thus 
creating a more complex model.  Also, policymakers should consider conducting more 
analysis of the relationships and dynamic changes that occur between currently 
unconneted propositions and concepts.  For example, there may be a causal link between 
24.1 and  24.4. 
For Figure 24 there are  four separate groupings of causally related concepts. To 
impove the overall coherence of the model, these four should be linked by more causal 
relationships to help the policymaker better understand the complex and dynamic, 
interrelated nature of the environment.  For example, a policymaker should consider how 
the currently causual relationship between research might show a causal relationship 
between 24.1 and 24.2 and 24.6.  That would link the concepts together in a way that 
both explaines the relational concepts of the policy, signaling a better undertanding of the 
complexity of the environment and it would also raise concept 24. 6 to a more complex, 
(concatenated) concept, thus improving the overall robutness and thereby the systemicity 
of the policy model. 
Integrated Concatenated Policy Goals Combined 
The AfPak policy model, itself, when all the propositions were analyzed, yielded a total 
of 111 concepts.  For Policy Goal 1 the total was seventy-seven.  For Policy Goal 2 the 
total was 13.  For Policy Goal 3 the total number of concepts was 21.  See Table 1 for a 
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comparison of the complexity and robustness/systemicity scores for each AfPak policy 
model (proposition). 
Wallis (2012) suggests “complexity (has more conceptual breadth) and more 
robustness (has more conceptual depth)” therefore it can be understood that the AfPak 
policy model has a total of 111 concepts reflecting conceptual breadth (p. 16).  However, 
the PA method results indicated that many of the concepts are linear.  In the previous 
subsections, each part of the policy model was diagrammed by a policy goal.  Each 
section addressed some weaknesses and suggested some opportunities for how the 
propositions could reflect a more robust set of relationships between the concepts and the 
policy goals.  The model showed that figure 10, para, 31 is the most robust/systemic with 
a score of 0.42.  This portion of the policy described a robust relationship about how 
changes in U.S. policy towards Pakistan could result in “Pakistan’s security and 
prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent” (Obama, para. 31, 2009).  More 
exploration of the interconnected causal relationships of the remanding policy 
propositions would be needed to bring the conceptual depths scores higher.   Wallis, 
(2014) suggests “another useful approach to improving models is to integrate multiple 
models to create a larger model that is more complex and more comprehensive” (p. 15).    
Continuing to explore the heuristic value of the PA paradigm, and incorporating the 
suggesting from Wallis, (2014) all of the concatenated concepts are pulled into one 
diagram (see figure 25).  The new integrated model shows all the concatenated concepts.   
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Table 1.  Comparison of Complexity and Robustness/Systemicity Scores 
AfPak Proposition Complexity Robustness 
Figure 5.  Obama, 
2009, para. 8. 
 
7 0.25 
Figure 6.  Obama, 
2009, para. 12. 
8 0.00 
Figure 7.  Obama, 
2009, para. 17. 
5 0.20 
Figure 8.  Obama, 
2009, para. 29. 
4 0.25 
Figure 9.  Obama, 
2009, para. 30. 
 
4 0.25 
Figure 10.  Obama, 
2009, para. 31. 
 
7 0.42 
Figure 11. Obama, 
2009, para. 23.  
 
5 0.20 
Figure 12.  Obama, 
2009, para. 24. 
 
5 0.20 
Figure 13. Obama, 
2009, para. 41.  
 
4 0.25 
Figure 14.  Obama, 
2009, para. 42. 
 
5 0.20 
Figure 15.  Obama, 
2009, para. 43. 
 
5 0.20 
Figure 16.  Obama, 
2009, para. 44. 
 
5 0.20 
 
Figure 17.  Obama, 
2009, para. 45. 
 
6 
 
0.16 
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Figure 18.  Obama, 
2009, para. 46. 
 
7 0.14 
Figure 19.  Obama, 
2009, para. 9. 
 
3 0.30 
Figure 20.  Obama, 
2009, para. 10. 
 
6 0.16 
Figure 21.  Obama, 
2009, para. 22. 
 
4 0.25 
Figure 22.  Obama, 
2009, para. 14. 
 
4 0.25 
Figure 23.  Obama, 
2009, para. 27. 
 
7 0.14 
Figure 24.  Obama, 
2009, para. 25. 
 
10 0.00 
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Figure 25.  Combined concepts. (Obama, 2009). 
 
 
 
 
PG 1:  5.2  More 
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 For Figure 25, the depiction of the 21 concatenated concepts combined allows for 
continued exploration of how the policy models’ concepts, overall, reflect the complex 
environment.  A review suggests that more consideration of the interrelatedness of the 
propositions needs to be explored.   For example,   PG 1, 7.5 and PG 1, 14.4 both suggest 
that they could bring about changes reflected in PG 1, 10.3 and PG 1, 9.3.  Further PG 1, 
8.3 could be the resultant causal change from the four stated concatenated concepts.   The 
causal relationships and changes that could occur between each policy statement, if 
further developed, could suggest alternative policy considerations.  The combination of 
the individual models however does yield insights into the ‘whole’ of the policy model.  
This view allows for a holistic consideration of all the policies’ concatenated concepts.  
Complexity theory suggests that a holistic perspective is better than framing the issues 
per the parts within the systems (Cilliers, 2002).  As a heuristic tool the PA paradigm 
allows for and facilitates such thinking through both this type of visual reference and 
methodology.    
 
Analytic Conclusions  
The research question is as follows: 
RQ:  By applying the PA policy analysis approach to the December 1, 2009, U.S. 
Obama administration’s AfPak policy; how can following the PA paradigm lead 
policymakers to discover how to better develop a policy? 
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The question was framed in the context of the theoretical framework of 
complexity theory and systems behavior and the setting for this research was framed 
within the context of a complex environment, namely that of the Afghanistan and 
Pakistan conflict of 2009 and the December 1, 2009, Obama Administration policy 
towards the conflict.  The argument was made that developing effective policy is very 
difficult (Dennard et al. 2008; Wallis, 2008a, 2013).  The United States has arguably 
considered resources and the benefit of focused practical and academic application to the 
topic of public policy, yet policies continue to either fail, not reach their intended goals or 
achieve less-than positive results (Wallis, 2011).  Within the social sciences community 
there has emerged a body of literature that suggests that systems thinking and complexity 
theory provides a framework for analysis that is suited to the public policy domain.  
Meeting the challenges identified in the literature, one new approach to answering the 
question of how to avoid policy failures was the PA paradigm and method of policy 
analysis developed by Wallis (2011).  The PA paradigm provides a new way to 
understand how one can understand changes that could occur within the policy 
environment (Wallis, 2011).  With new insights, policymakers could expect to achieve 
more reliable policy.  
The PA paradigm compels a policymaker to consider moving beyond a cognitive 
framework that focuses on the “what is” and move to the “what could be” within the 
dynamic complex environment.  This study determined to explore the heuristic value of 
using the PA paradigm.  This exploratory research sought to learn more about the PA 
paradigm where the PA paradigm argues that thinking about complexity and 
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robustness/systemicity in a policy will lead to better policy development practices.  
Exploratory research is necessary where there are relatively few studies about a theory or 
method of analytic research on a topic.  Exploratory research attempts to provide an 
objective description of the research question and learn more about it (Babbie, 2001, Yin, 
2011).   
The requirement to re-think our analytic frameworks of our emergent and 
adaptive adversaries extends to both our homeland security challenges and those security 
concerns around the world that affect our homeland.  In order to describe and understand 
with conceptual clarity, how current and future conflicts are emerging it is necessary to 
look to theories that look at those interactions among and between entities within a 
conflict environment and also to then  attempt to describe  how those interactions change, 
will change again, interact,  change over time, evolve, learn, and adapt.   
For this study the December 1, 2009, Obama policy was used to learn more about 
the heuristic value of the PA paradigm.  The AfPak policy came to be recognized as 
particularly difficult and presented what has been termed “n-body problems” (Walker & 
Malici, 2011, p. 276).  Recall, the number of concepts within the AfPak policy was 111.  
More research on the n-body of causal concepts that could be further explored (for more 
concepts that would increase the robustness/systemicity score) would likely yield even 
more concepts.  This analysis was beyond the scope of this study as this study focused on 
the concepts that were clearly presented within the current policy.  By applying the 
conceptual underpinnings of the PA paradigm it became clear that the thinking about 
concepts within a policy could affect how a policy is developed.  For this policy, the 
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analytic results suggest the Obama administration envisioned a policy environment that 
could not only be addressed by the United States but also a broader range of regional and 
transregional actors.  The Obama administration policy chose to frame, or conceptualize, 
the “problems” as explicitly regional and transregional and viewed successful policy 
changes as those that utilized alternative methods of power, as opposed to a heavy focus 
on military strength (Obama, 2009; Walker & Malici, 2011).   
This was reflected in Policy Goal 1, We must deny al Qaeda a safehaven (Obama, 
2009, para. 21).  Within Policy Goal 1 there were 14 concatenated aspects out of the 20 
for the overall policy.  There were 74 concepts overall for this goal of the policy.  The 
number of concatenated numbers within this section of the policy goals were 
conceptualized as a complex and co-evolving policy problem.  Wallis (2011) concluded 
some concepts are linear in nature, or phrased differently, causal policy propositions are 
understood as “simplistic cause and effect mechanisms” (p. 80).  With 14 concatenated 
concepts, PA suggests Policy Goal 1 could be more effective.  Without a well-developed 
body of policies from which to compare findings, the use of PA as a paradigm did prompt 
the researcher to consider the “what could be” questions and think about a broader range 
of occurrences that could occur between policy execution and a potential changed state.   
Specific to Policy Goal 1, Figure 11, for example, more analysis could be done 
that would yield insights into that the future complex environment where other actions 
among the allies could potentially work against each other to create less security around 
the world.  The PA method suggests that “tacit assumptions that are in opposition to (or 
in concert with) the explicit policy” could hinder the functionality of that policy (Wallis, 
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2011, p. 101).  More research would be needed to explore self-reinforcing assumptions 
about the future complex environment and its behavioral characteristics or concepts.  The 
use of PA would be to ask how many results may be achieved through the single causal 
action? And, what types of concatenated propositions  would inform a strategist charged 
with aliging resources and capactiy towards the problem?   A policymaker would need to 
explore this relationship more.  The analysis of this structure found in Figure 10 infers 
that  Pakistan would be able to target “those groups that threaten our country” thus, the 
causal relationships of “clear intentions,” “partnerships based on respect,” “more 
international support for those Pakistanis displaced by the fighting,” “refugees,” and 
“American strong support of Pakistan’s security an prosperity long after the guns have 
fallen silent” would merit a more detailed analysis of the logic structures  behind the 
policy and a clearer understanding of how so many outcomes would be achieved from 
few initial actions (Obama, 2009; Wallis, 2014).  For a policymaker it remains important 
to understand how the systems could behave in order to inform how strategies and 
resources would be developed for this policy statement.   
To help explain more, in 11.2 the concept is that the system that is the NATO 
alliance will naturally maintain NATO alliance credibility (Obama, 2009).  A policy that 
assumes that “more commitment from our allies” will make NATO stable might miss the 
systems of competing local goals that are not compatible with U. S. interests.  One 
consideration, for example could be that the policy could lead to the undoing of the 
NATO alliance and result in instability in other nations.  This consideration would likely 
result in a re-framing of the policy.   
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For Figure 12, the PA method would suggest that a policymaker should consider 
how the currently causal relationship between the concepts might show a more complex 
relationship or a complex concatenated logic model between 12.5 and 12.3.  For example, 
more analysis could yield that an American force transfer from Afghanistan combined 
with limited forces from NATO could create a new system or complex environment. 
Where, combined, they could create a change that runs counter to the policy model 
currently which suggest that the future would be a more effective Afghanistan population 
that is more responsible for its own future.  The PA method would suggest that a 
consideration of the systems as they could behave would influence the analysis of the 
policymaker and would prompt the further research of how to tell if the policy reflects the 
change states intended.   
Figure 13 did present a clear set of concepts that articulate the future complex 
environment within the policy.  However, a policymaker would need to refine the 
concepts in order to allow for the development of plans and resources to account for such 
interrelated change in the systems.  In other words, and as stated in Chapter 3, a policy 
lives in a space bounded on one side by the theory of how an issue is understood and on 
the other by the action or strategy (Wallis, 2011).  Wallis (2011) suggested that the “text 
of the policy, itself may be seen as a ‘lynchpin’ in the process of research and practice 
that determines the effectiveness, efficiency, and the validity of decisions” (p. 13).  
Because the systems of failed states and diffuse actors as concepts present a wide range 
of causal concepts that impact on the overall whole of the concept or system,  enacting a 
policy based on such concepts will also be likely difficult to implement.   
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For example, that violent extremism beyond the borders of Afghanistan and 
Pakistan will exist leaves open a broad range of policy administration functions that 
would then need to be considered.  The concepts of what those policy administration 
functions would be,  such as more increase in “homeland security funding to secure the 
borders would lead to more monitoring of individuals within U.S. borders,” would need 
to be explored for their relationship to the desired changes that the policy is directed 
towards (Obama, 2009, para. 43).  Without an explicit concept for how the divergent 
Departments (such as the Department of Homeland Security or the Justice Department) 
would be integral to the overall dynamic and complex environment, from a policy 
implementation perspective, an unintended consequence of the policy could be that the 
policy would fail on economic grounds.   
The model in Figure 15 suggests that it could  be integrated into Figure 13 where 
there was presented a conceptual model of the future and its causal relationships.  By 
reviewing the combined total diagram it is clear that the policy did not explicitly account 
for a concatenated concept.  Applying PA, as a paradigm, a policymaker could address 
the question of  how the Department of Homeland Security would behave in the systems 
of sytems, if delienated with more concatenated propositions and  reflecting the complex 
robustness/systemicity of the policy, suggests that the policy could be improved.  Again, 
further analysis on this concept might revel considered economic considerations that 
could negativly impact the policy changes desired due to fiscal challenges within the 
United States, and among partner nations that may be called on to share the economic 
burden.   
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There were 13 total concepts for Policy Goal 2, of which only three were 
concatenated concepts.  The expected change within the policy environment for Policy 
Goal 2:  If the Taliban’s momentum is reversed then the Afghanistan government will not 
be overthrown is reflective of a possible concatenated structure; however, the 
policymaker would need to clarify the changes that could occur as a result of the 
stakeholders being able to reverse the Taliban’s momentum.   
There were 21 total concepts for Policy Goal 3.  There were two concatenated 
concepts.  The expected change within the policy environment for Goal 3:  If the capacity 
of Afghanistan’ security forces and government are strengthened then they can take the 
lead in Afghanistan’s future and American troops can come home is determined to not be 
very effective (Obama, 2009).  
For Policy Goal 3, Figure 24, there are four separate groupings of causally related 
concepts. To impove the overall coherence of the model, these four should be linked by 
more causal relationships to help the policymaker better understand the complex and 
dynamic, interrelated nature of the environment.  For example, a policymaker should 
consider how the currently causual relationship between research might show a causal 
relationship between 24.1 and 24.2 and 24.6.  This would link the concepts together in a 
way that both explaines the relational concepts of the policy, signaling a better 
undertanding of the complexity of the environment and it would also raise concept 24.6 
to a more complex, (concatenated) concept, thus improving the overall robutness and 
thereby the systemicity of the policy model. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Interpretations of Findings 
The purpose of this study was to develop a deeper understanding of and learn 
more about the heuristic contributions of the Propositional Analysis paradigm to 
policymaking and policy analysis. Policy models, theories, analysis, and development 
must adapt to and account for the inherent complexity and change that exists within a 
complex policy environment (Banks, 2008; John, 2003; Morçöl, 2012; Sabatier, 2007; 
Wallis, 2011).  A thorough understanding of complexity theory and nonlinear behavior 
within systems suggests that nonlinear behaviors within policy environments, and 
generally to the nature on nonlinear conflict, or warfare, will demand new approaches to 
policymaking that are informed from a broad range of disciplines (Bar-Yam, 2004; 
Lawson, 2011; Lawson, 2014).  Propositional analysis suggests that such discourse 
within the policy is amenable to analysis and that propositions within the policy are 
amenable to analytic efforts to determine a policy’s complexity and systemicity and 
thereby think about possible changes that could occur within the policy environment 
(Wallis, 2011).  This was borne out by this research.   
This study considered how rigorous scientific methods of research could be 
applied by considering the PA paradigm towards policy development.    The research 
design for this study was developed to explore the heuristic value of the PA paradigm.  
This methodology was used because it provided a comprehensive description of how both 
the PA tool (PA as a method of policy analysis) and the implied paradigm could support 
effective policymaking.  A detailed understanding of how to think about change in a 
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future policy environment would not have been possible if a less rigorous research design 
had been used.  The PA paradigm is about finding structure and with structure, it is 
possible to assess and consider causal relationships that could impact the outcome of the 
policy and suggest improvements.  
The data set for this study consisted entirely of the December 1, 2009 presidential 
policy toward the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflict.  It was purposefully selected, in 
part, because the policy environment represented a complex and dynamic environment 
(Obama, 2009).  The analysis was completed by assessing the heuristic value of the PA 
paradigm.  
Perhaps, however before the remainder of this chapter concludes it should be 
stated that most salient finding from this was that policy problems characterized by 
complex, nonlinear environments and their solutions are in a perpetual state of change; 
hence, as Lawson (2014) argued, policy issues do not stay solved.   
 The first section of this chapter includes an interpretation of the findings.  The 
second section discusses implications for social change.  The chapter concludes with 
recommendations for future research.  
           Interpretation of the Findings 
This study set out to answer the following research question: By applying the PA 
policy analysis approach to the December 1, 2009, Obama administration AfPak policy, 
how can following the PA paradigm lead policymakers to discover how to better develop 
a policy?  This study demonstrated from the findings that any policy might be improved 
by more analysis. The PA paradigm is different because it uses the structure within a 
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policy itself to show where research should be directed, suggesting where to focus on 
making better policy.  It was learned that increasing the number of concepts (in general) 
and increasing the number of concatenated concepts (in particular) serves as an indicator 
showing where research might be accomplished to enhance the effectiveness of the 
policy.  Using the PA paradigm will benefit policymakers as it indicates a path for 
analysts to do better work at lower cost.  It was noted earlier that the time to evaluate 
policy alternatives is before a policy is implemented as it could save lives, and resources. 
The PA paradigm suggests that a policymaker can accelerate their ability to create more 
agile policy in response to rapidly changing conditions (Wallis, 2013). 
Responsible researchers also need to evaluate the method of conducting and 
analyzing the research. While the research question was not directed at how to evaluate 
the PA tool, Babbie (2001) suggested evaluating whether the study was replicable, 
falsifiable, precise, and parsimonious. Yin (2011) also emphasized the importance of 
evaluating the study’s reliability and validity.  With this consideration of what should be 
addressed within a study these questions are addressed. 
This study demonstrated that the method identified in PA is replicable.  A 
policymaker could follow the steps taken in this study, as identified in the PA method, 
and derive an understanding about how the concepts (propositions) within a policy help 
shape and communicate one’s understanding of the policy environment.   
The question of falsifiable was evidenced in the analytic research findings, 
whereby the research demonstrated that it was possible to evaluate the reliability of the 
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study as the measures used to identify the complexity and robustness/systemicity score 
can be consistently observed.  This gives an objective value to the study.   
The research analytic findings also addressed preciseness.  By stating the research 
question precisely, policymakers can ensure that they can conduct their own and this 
research would yield similar results.   
Finally, to address parsimony, the PA method demonstrated that the principle of 
parsimony as providing simplicity to the methodological process under study was 
achieved.  The results of the analysis (referencing PA as a tool) are straightforward.  A 
sound understanding of how the research could yield insights into the heuristic value of 
the PA paradigm was achieved.  Previous research suggests that a policymaker would be 
prompted to consider the behavioral characteristics between existing relationships (i.e., 
adaptive, co-evolving) within the policy environment and how change, both within the 
policy environment and external to the policy environment (for example, U.S. economic 
impacts), would occur once the policy was implemented.  
Propositional Analysis is a rigorous method that leads policymakers to understand 
how the concepts within a policy shape policy outcomes. Propositional Analysis offers 
the advantage of multiple forms of analysis that can be used to help triangulate research 
methods focused on better outcomes of the policy.  This study demonstrated how an 
interwoven PA structural approach along with empirical approaches used to validate the 
causal relationships serves to develop better policy.   
The findings from this study, while heuristic, contribute to the body of knowledge 
on policymaking towards future complex environments.  If a policymaker wants to better 
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understand how to develop effective policy, this study serves to inform the process before 
another policy is developed.  Another important outcome was this study’s demonstration 
that policymakers must monitor causal relationships between a policy’s intentions and 
changes that need to occur while the environment unfolds.  
A final finding is a caution about trying to infer that a greater number of concepts 
leads to a more robust policy.  An analysis of the president’s AfPak policy suggests this 
is not necessarily the case.  Using PA as a paradigm serves to prompt a policymaker, 
prior to policy execution, to consider change as a behavioral characteristic within the 
policy environment.  Using PA as a tool would prompt a policymaker to work through 
how well the policy environment could be better reflected within the propositions of the 
policy.  Robustness, in a more traditional sense, and as it applies to policy outcomes and 
this study would mean that policy change (the goal of the policy) would necessarily need 
to consider how to develop rigorous, resilient, and robust policy goals that address the 
emergent characteristics within the policy.  Morçöl (2012) summarized this best: “The 
problem is whether and to what extent emergent system properties can remain robust 
when changes take place at a micro level” (p. 269).    
The challenge for the policymaker is to consider a broad range of complex, 
interrelated, adaptive, co-evolving characteristics within the policy environment and how 
best to develop a policy that would both achieve a successful and positive change–while 
not failing.  Related to this finding, the research suggests that while the nature of such 
causal relationships could prove difficult to explore, every effort should be made to fall 
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back to the PA paradigm and the characteristics of complexity to inform the process of 
developing a policy.  
Those involved in the policymaking process–stakeholders, other nations, and 
those charged with providing input into the policy should understand how change as a 
concept inherent in the theory of complexity presents unique opportunities to effect 
positive changes.  Policymakers must be able to learn from such studies, as this one, to 
better understand how the cognitive and narrative communicative components of policy 
words impact policy outcomes.  Policymakers need to pay attention to how policy issues 
are conceptualized as systems of systems.  This aspect of conceptualizing a future, with a 
marked consideration of how change occurs, underscores this study.   
Implications for Positive Social Change  
Early in this study I quoted an important question: “What is complexity theory’s 
contribution to our understanding of policy analysis?” (Morcol, 2008, p. 24).  Dennard et 
al. (2008) hinted at the value of understanding the dialectic processes for change.  They 
suggested real-world complexity must be addressed, arguing that “social change happens 
in the transition from one stage of order to another.  Policies therefore that address only 
the past or the ideal of the future often miss or distort the evolutionary processes already 
afoot in society” (p. 9).  If policy remains a central feature in shaping a positive future 
and impact on the need for improved social well-being, policymakers must determine 
how the complexity of our environment impacts the policy-making process to effect 
positive social change.   
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Throughout this study the evidence suggested this nation continues to be engaged 
across a complex, dynamic, and ambiguous world in which complex environments are 
not well considered and policy solutions are difficult to develop.  Moreover, 
policymakers are often challenged to understand the interrelated systemic nature of the 
policy environment whereby only symptoms of the policy are readily apparent but the 
underlying and more complex symptoms are masked.  All this should concern the social 
science community.  To bring about a positive social change through more effective 
policy, policymakers must recognize and embrace the world’s complexity.  The literature 
for this study highlighted some of the causes of the complexity: technological changes 
and conflict boundaries, which include not just physical borders, political groups, and 
balance-of power boundaries.  These changes expand to social systems, belief systems 
that reach beyond traditional borders, cultural systems, weapons systems, 
communications systems, governance systems, cyber systems, and an expanding set of 
systems yet to be imagined (e.g., the emergent field of robotics).  Thus, our public 
policies must incorporate a more holistic approach to address the issues at hand (Bar-
Yam, 2004).   
This study helps a policymaker better understand how such dynamic complex 
factors affect existing cognitive processes and policymaking approaches, which at times 
have proved to inadequate for 21st century complex policymaking efforts (Dennard et al., 
2008).  These continually emerging realities require a more considered application of the 
policymaking tools that have been informed by complexity and systems thinking that has 
conceptualized the policy environment as being systemic.  A more clear understanding of 
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the heuristic value of such applications as PA can effect positive social change for this 
nation.    
Recommendations Future Research  
This study was framed within the argument that complexity theory serves a useful 
theoretic framework for policymakers to effect better policies towards complex 
environments.  The PA paradigm suggests that thinking about change within the policy 
environment is a significant part of the policymaking process.  Throughout the study it 
became clear that public policy toward complex and nonlinear environments, such as the 
Afghanistan and Pakistan war, and the current conflict in Russian and the Ukraine as of 
2014 (described by Pomerantzev [2014] as Putin’s nonlinear war) will significantly 
challenge the field of public policy and the social sciences community writ large.  
Research toward the causal events between a policy’s proposed outcomes and the causal 
behaviors of, perhaps, competing systems with the policy environment needs to be 
explored.  While this study suggests that the PA paradigm provides a more objective tool 
and paradigm for thinking about how to conceptually represent change within a policy, 
future policy studies could help compare or contrast the results and findings from such 
research.  This is a limitation within the current policy study.   
Limitations within the study findings are a significant consideration for future 
research.  For example, while the policy models within this study suggest a low 
robustness/systemicity scale (between 0.0 and 0.42), without more policy studies there 
remains a limitation to advance comparative findings.  Future studies could include more 
policies, such as policies directed toward the 2014 Russian-Ukrainian or Iraq and Syria 
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crises.  With a more developed understanding of the nature of warfare and conflict, as 
systems, and more policies analyzed using PA, policymakers could more quickly find the 
results of this type of research applicable to current policy development.   
Future research could also ask a new research question.  For example: How would 
the results of the PA method, as a tool, be useful for the general public to open the debate 
to the public on the potential effectiveness of the policy?  Wallis (2011) suggested, 
“When faced with two competing policies, the best idea would be to choose the policy 
that has the highest level of complexity and robustness” (p. 89).   A participatory public, 
engaged on the topic of advancing a policy position and positive outcomes, would benefit 
from tools such as PA to aid in deciding alternatives to competing policies and “robust 
options” (Banks, 2008, p. 123).  
Summary 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, marked a new era of threats on U.S. soil.  
Policymakers’ intent to address the attack put forth a broad range of policies intent to 
change the future environment (Gardner, 2008; H. Res. 107-131, 2001).  The literature, 
however, suggests that a partial reason for why the attacks happened was that there were 
previously failures, namely policy failures, in part, attributed to the failure connect the 
dots within the myriad of interconnected networked actors across a diffuse battlespace 
(Gardner, 2008; Walker & Malici, 2011).  The implicit logical conclusion would be that 
with clarity of the connected dots, policymakers would then be armed with a total picture 
of the issues, which in turn would better shape policies to secure the national defense 
(Gardner, 2008).  It is a perspective that continues.  The point is understood that the 
137 
 
 
language used to describe how one understands a situation matters.  In this case a 
metaphor. For example, President Obama stated, in reference to the failed “Christmas 
Day” bomber plot of 2010,  that “the government had sufficient information to uncover 
the terror plot to bring down a commercial jetliner on Christmas Day,  but that 
intelligence officials had ‘failed to connect those dots’” (Obama, 2010).  The metaphor is 
used to convey a sense that if all manner of disparate information, from different data 
sources, etc. were somehow connected, sensemaking would ensue and the picture would 
be clear (Taleb, 2007, 2012).  The problem with this metaphoric reasoning is that it leads 
an analyst (policymaker or otherwise) to presuppose that answer could have been known.  
This is not the case.  The so-called answer or the picture is not already pre-cut and 
determined beforehand.  Have you ever been asked to look to the stars to find the 
astrological sign of Leo or Aries in the sky?  It would be interesting to note that in order 
to see the astrological signs, a stargazer would have first been amenable to altering their 
analytic perspectives as to what to look for among the stars, then be able to assemble as 
many of those stars as were visible to describe the facsimile of the image known as Leo 
or Aries.  A construct in and of itself that would need to be understood.  The challenge 
for such star gazers or dot-connectors then would be to find a way to array all the stars in 
such a way as to determine which ones will yield the ‘whole picture’ – from all the stars 
and then to decide which ones are relevant to form the picture, which ones are not,  and 
what is still missing.  As more and more data (dots and stars to continue with this 
metaphor analogy) becomes available, the picture becomes crowded and it’s harder, not 
easier to see a larger picture.  The dots that might have been important are not necessarily 
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any clearer, even though they may have been there all along, they are simply still there as 
part of the larger constellation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Wallis, 2013).   
To describe and understand how current and future complex policy environments 
are changing, it is first necessary to look theoretically at the interactions among entities 
within a complex policy environment.  One must then describe how multiple actors in 
systems interactions change, will change again, interact, change over time, evolve, learn, 
and adapt (Smith & Larimer, 2009).  Those challenged to analyze complex policy issues 
and develop policies, are challenged to think about how to think about what is known, 
knowable, and unknown, and unknowable and to understand how the changes within the 
environment are occurring (Taleb, 2012).  It is more than just connecting the dots.  New 
metaphors, in part, can create the conditions for thinking about change (Bousquet & 
Curtis, 2011; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  With unprecedented challenges such as complex, 
ambiguous, or diffuse (Obama, 2009) threats, environments new methods of knowledge 
production need to be introduced into both the academic and practical domains of public 
policy.  Public policy has been one of the principal means by which societies effect social 
change, to include social behaviors, and social institutions.  With public policy 
agreements and arrangements, a relative type of stability can be conferred upon those 
who enter into such arrangements or policy agreements (Banks, 2008; Morçöl 2012).  
The challenges of today, however, require that public policies pertaining to war 
and peace, conflicts and security arrangements, and strategy agreements should be 
developed in such a way that will help yield positive changes in a complex, 
interconnected globalized world.  The more ambitious and complex the security 
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arrangements, strategies, and public policies become, the more complex the demands are 
on those formulation the public policies to incorporate the multifactorial characteristics of 
the systems (Banks, 2008).   
Effectual policy necessitates a considered understanding of the causally-related 
challenges that that the nation faces in an era of persistence change.  For the 
policymakers, whether intently focused on the current policy challenge of the day, or 
tomorrow, those that strive to effect positive social change must be able to think about the 
complexities of change within the policy environment.  They must remain aware that the 
words within the policy reflect one’s understanding of the future complex environment.  
Both the academic and practical domain of public policy have begun to embrace the 
science of complexity and analytic methodologies derived from the theoretical 
framework.  Still, more research is needed into how the policy narrative serves as that 
critical linchpin between the actual policy environments and how it shapes the policy 
outcomes envisaged, and narrated with the policy (Wallis, 2011).   
Words convey meaning.  Schlesinger (2008) summarizes the relationship of 
policies and their content where he stated  “Policies and words are inextricably linked – 
the former cannot be conjured in the absence of the latter” (Schlesinger, 2008, p. 10). 
Those who do not endeavor to understand how complexity is manifested within 
our increasingly complex environments, such as warfare, nor  why the nonlinear nature of 
our policy environments demands alternative analytic methodologies run the risk of 
falling back on institutionally approved and habituated analytic processes rooted in 19th 
century paradigms (Wallerstein, 2001, 2004).  Social scientists within the realm of public 
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administration have an ethical duty to seek out every possible analytic methodology that 
accounts for how a desired change in the future unfolds and changes.  
In conclusion, the PA paradigm, complexity theory and propositional analysis 
methods are vitally important to the field of public policy.  Change makers must be able 
to change the way they play the game.   
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Appendix A: AfPak Policy Speech Transcript 
 
Remarks by President Obama in an Address to the Nation on the Way Forward in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan 
 
December 9, 2009 
 
1. THE PRESIDENT:  Good evening.  To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men 
and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans:  I want to speak to you tonight 
about our effort in Afghanistan -- the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, 
and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful 
conclusion.  It's an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point -- where so many men 
and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our 
country. 
2. To address these important issues, it's important to recall why America and our allies 
were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place.  We did not ask for this fight. On 
September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 
people.  They struck at our military and economic nerve centers.  They took the lives of innocent 
men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station.  Were it not for the 
heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the 
great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more. 
3. As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda -- a group of extremists who have distorted 
and defiled Islam, one of the world’s great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al 
Qaeda’s base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban -- a 
ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged 
by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had 
turned elsewhere. 
4. Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who 
harbored them -- an authorization that continues to this day.  The vote in the Senate was 98 to 
nothing.  The vote in the House was 420 to 1.  For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 -- the commitment that says an attack on one member 
nation is an attack on all.  And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all 
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necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks.  America, our allies and the world were acting as 
one to destroy al Qaeda’s terrorist network and to protect our common security. 
5. Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy -- and only after the 
Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden -- we sent our troops into Afghanistan.  Within a 
matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed.  The Taliban was 
driven from power and pushed back on its heels.  A place that had known decades of fear now had 
reason to hope.  At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established 
under President Hamid Karzai.  And an International Security Assistance Force was established to 
help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country. 
6. Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq.  The 
wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here.  It's enough to 
say that for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, 
our diplomacy, and our national attention -- and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial 
rifts between America and much of the world. 
7. Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end.  We 
will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the 
end of 2011.  That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in 
uniform.  (Applause.)  Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a 
chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people.  
8. But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has 
deteriorated.  After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda’s 
leadership established a safe haven there.  Although a legitimate government was elected by the 
Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, 
and insufficient security forces.  
9. Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as 
they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government.  Gradually, the Taliban has begun to 
control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and 
devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people. 
10.  Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a 
fraction of what they were in Iraq.  When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans 
serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war.  Commanders in 
Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these 
reinforcements did not arrive.  And that's why, shortly after taking office, I approved a 
longstanding request for more troops.  After consultations with our allies, I then announced a 
strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the 
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extremist safe havens in Pakistan.  I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, 
dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our 
military and civilian efforts.  
11. Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives.  High-ranking al 
Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda 
worldwide. In Pakistan, that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years.  In 
Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and -- 
although it was marred by fraud -- that election produced a government that is consistent with 
Afghanistan's laws and constitution. 
12. Yet huge challenges remain.  Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has 
moved backwards.  There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the 
Taliban has gained momentum.  Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers 
as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border.  And our forces lack the full 
support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the 
population.  Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the 
security situation is more serious than he anticipated.  In short:  The status quo is not sustainable. 
13. As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger.  Some of you 
fought in Afghanistan.  Some of you will deploy there.  As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you 
a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service.  And that's why, after the Afghan 
voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy.  Now, let me be 
clear:  There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so 
there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this 
review period.  Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the 
different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in 
Afghanistan, and our key partners.  And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- 
and our troops -- no less. 
14. This review is now complete.  And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined 
that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to 
Afghanistan.  After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home.  These are the resources that 
we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible 
transition of our forces out of Afghanistan.  
15. I do not make this decision lightly.  I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I 
believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-
term consequences of our actions.  We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in 
lives and resources.  Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national 
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security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort.  And 
having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American 
people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at 
home. 
16. Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you -- a military that, 
along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens.  As President, I have 
signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars.  I 
have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed.  I visited our courageous 
wounded warriors at Walter Reed.  I've traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 
Americans returning home to their final resting place.  I see firsthand the terrible wages of war.  If 
I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at 
stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow. 
17. So, no, I do not make this decision lightly.  I make this decision because I am 
convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  This is the epicenter of violent 
extremism practiced by al Qaeda.  It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from 
here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak.  This is no idle danger; no hypothetical 
threat.  In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who 
were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. 
And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with 
impunity.  We must keep the pressure on al Qaeda, and to do that, we must increase the stability 
and capacity of our partners in the region. 
18. Of course, this burden is not ours alone to bear.  This is not just America's 
war.  Since 9/11, al Qaeda’s safe havens have been the source of attacks against London and 
Amman and Bali.  The people and governments of both Afghanistan and Pakistan are 
endangered.  And the stakes are even higher within a nuclear-armed Pakistan, because we know 
that al Qaeda and other extremists seek nuclear weapons, and we have every reason to believe that 
they would use them. 
19. These facts compel us to act along with our friends and allies.  Our overarching 
goal remains the same:  to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
and to prevent its capacity to threaten America and our allies in the future.  
20. To meet that goal, we will pursue the following objectives within 
Afghanistan.  We must deny al Qaeda a safe haven.  We must reverse the Taliban's momentum 
and deny it the ability to overthrow the government.  And we must strengthen the capacity of 
Afghanistan's security forces and government so that they can take lead responsibility for 
Afghanistan's future.  
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21. We will meet these objectives in three ways.  First, we will pursue a military 
strategy that will break the Taliban's momentum and increase Afghanistan's capacity over the next 
18 months. 
22. The 30,000 additional troops that I'm announcing tonight will deploy in the first 
part of 2010 -- the fastest possible pace -- so that they can target the insurgency and secure key 
population centers.  They'll increase our ability to train competent Afghan security forces, and to 
partner with them so that more Afghans can get into the fight.  And they will help create the 
conditions for the United States to transfer responsibility to the Afghans.  
23. Because this is an international effort, I've asked that our commitment be joined 
by contributions from our allies.  Some have already provided additional troops, and we're 
confident that there will be further contributions in the days and weeks ahead. Our friends have 
fought and bled and died alongside us in Afghanistan.  And now, we must come together to end 
this war successfully.  For what's at stake is not simply a test of NATO's credibility -- what's at 
stake is the security of our allies, and the common security of the world. 
24. But taken together, these additional American and international troops will 
allow us to accelerate handing over responsibility to Afghan forces, and allow us to begin the 
transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July of 2011.  Just as we have done in Iraq, we will 
execute this transition responsibly, taking into account conditions on the ground.  We'll continue 
to advise and assist Afghanistan's security forces to ensure that they can succeed over the long 
haul.  But it will be clear to the Afghan government -- and, more importantly, to the Afghan 
people -- that they will ultimately be responsible for their own country.  
25. Second, we will work with our partners, the United Nations, and the Afghan 
people to pursue a more effective civilian strategy, so that the government can take advantage of 
improved security. 
26. This effort must be based on performance.  The days of providing a blank check 
are over.  President Karzai's inauguration speech sent the right message about moving in a new 
direction.  And going forward, we will be clear about what we expect from those who receive our 
assistance.  We'll support Afghan ministries, governors, and local leaders that combat corruption 
and deliver for the people.  We expect those who are ineffective or corrupt to be held 
accountable.  And we will also focus our assistance in areas -- such as agriculture -- that can make 
an immediate impact in the lives of the Afghan people. 
27. The people of Afghanistan have endured violence for decades. They've been 
confronted with occupation -- by the Soviet Union, and then by foreign al Qaeda fighters who 
used Afghan land for their own purposes.  So tonight, I want the Afghan people to understand -- 
America seeks an end to this era of war and suffering.  We have no interest in occupying your 
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country.  We will support efforts by the Afghan government to open the door to those Taliban who 
abandon violence and respect the human rights of their fellow citizens.  And we will seek a 
partnership with Afghanistan grounded in mutual respect -- to isolate those who destroy; to 
strengthen those who build; to hasten the day when our troops will leave; and to forge a lasting 
friendship in which America is your partner, and never your patron. 
28. Third, we will act with the full recognition that our success in Afghanistan is 
inextricably linked to our partnership with Pakistan. 
29. We're in Afghanistan to prevent a cancer from once again spreading through that 
country.  But this same cancer has also taken root in the border region of Pakistan.  That's why we 
need a strategy that works on both sides of the border. 
30. In the past, there have been those in Pakistan who've argued that the struggle 
against extremism is not their fight, and that Pakistan is better off doing little or seeking 
accommodation with those who use violence.  But in recent years, as innocents have been killed 
from Karachi to Islamabad, it has become clear that it is the Pakistani people who are the most 
endangered by extremism.  Public opinion has turned.  The Pakistani army has waged an offensive 
in Swat and South Waziristan.  And there is no doubt that the United States and Pakistan share a 
common enemy. 
31. In the past, we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly.  Those 
days are over.  Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is built on a 
foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust. We will strengthen Pakistan’s 
capacity to target those groups that threaten our countries, and have made it clear that we cannot 
tolerate a safe haven for terrorists whose location is known and whose intentions are 
clear.  America is also providing substantial resources to support Pakistan’s democracy and 
development.  We are the largest international supporter for those Pakistanis displaced by the 
fighting.  And going forward, the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong 
supporter of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the 
great potential of its people can be unleashed. 
32. These are the three core elements of our strategy:  a military effort to create the 
conditions for a transition; a civilian surge that reinforces positive action; and an effective 
partnership with Pakistan. 
33. I recognize there are a range of concerns about our approach.  So let me briefly 
address a few of the more prominent arguments that I've heard, and which I take very seriously. 
34. First, there are those who suggest that Afghanistan is another Vietnam.  They 
argue that it cannot be stabilized, and we're better off cutting our losses and rapidly 
withdrawing.  I believe this argument depends on a false reading of history.  Unlike Vietnam, we 
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are joined by a broad coalition of 43 nations that recognizes the legitimacy of our action.  Unlike 
Vietnam, we are not facing a broad-based popular insurgency.  And most importantly, unlike 
Vietnam, the American people were viciously attacked from Afghanistan, and remain a target for 
those same extremists who are plotting along its border.  To abandon this area now -- and to rely 
only on efforts against al Qaeda from a distance -- would significantly hamper our ability to keep 
the pressure on al Qaeda, and create an unacceptable risk of additional attacks on our homeland 
and our allies.  
35. Second, there are those who acknowledge that we can't leave Afghanistan in its 
current state, but suggest that we go forward with the troops that we already have.  But this would 
simply maintain a status quo in which we muddle through, and permit a slow deterioration of 
conditions there.  It would ultimately prove more costly and prolong our stay in Afghanistan, 
because we would never be able to generate the conditions needed to train Afghan security forces 
and give them the space to take over. 
36. Finally, there are those who oppose identifying a time frame for our transition to 
Afghan responsibility.  Indeed, some call for a more dramatic and open-ended escalation of our 
war effort  -- one that would commit us to a nation-building project of up to a decade.  I reject this 
course because it sets goals that are beyond what can be achieved at a reasonable cost, and what 
we need to achieve to secure our interests.  Furthermore, the absence of a time frame for transition 
would deny us any sense of urgency in working with the Afghan government.  It must be clear that 
Afghans will have to take responsibility for their security, and that America has no interest in 
fighting an endless war in Afghanistan. 
37. As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our means, 
or our interests.  And I must weigh all of the challenges that our nation faces.  I don't have the 
luxury of committing to just one.  Indeed, I'm mindful of the words of President Eisenhower, who 
-- in discussing our national security -- said, "Each proposal must be weighed in the light of a 
broader consideration:  the need to maintain balance in and among national programs." 
38. Over the past several years, we have lost that balance.  We've failed to 
appreciate the connection between our national security and our economy.  In the wake of an 
economic crisis, too many of our neighbors and friends are out of work and struggle to pay the 
bills.  Too many Americans are worried about the future facing our children.  Meanwhile, 
competition within the global economy has grown more fierce.  So we can't simply afford to 
ignore the price of these wars. 
39. All told, by the time I took office the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
approached a trillion dollars.  Going forward, I am committed to addressing these costs openly and 
honestly.  Our new approach in Afghanistan is likely to cost us roughly $30 billion for the military 
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this year, and I'll work closely with Congress to address these costs as we work to bring down our 
deficit. 
40. But as we end the war in Iraq and transition to Afghan responsibility, we must 
rebuild our strength here at home.  Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power.  It pays for 
our military.  It underwrites our diplomacy.  It taps the potential of our people, and allows 
investment in new industry.  And it will allow us to compete in this century as successfully as we 
did in the last.  That's why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended -- because 
the nation that I'm most interested in building is our own. 
41. Now, let me be clear:  None of this will be easy.  The struggle against violent 
extremism will not be finished quickly, and it extends well beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan.  It 
will be an enduring test of our free society, and our leadership in the world.  And unlike the great 
power conflicts and clear lines of division that defined the 20th century, our effort will involve 
disorderly regions, failed states, diffuse enemies. 
42. So as a result, America will have to show our strength in the way that we end 
wars and prevent conflict -- not just how we wage wars.  We'll have to be nimble and precise in 
our use of military power.  Where al Qaeda and its allies attempt to establish a foothold -- whether 
in Somalia or Yemen or elsewhere -- they must be confronted by growing pressure and strong 
partnerships. 
43. And we can't count on military might alone.  We have to invest in our homeland 
security, because we can't capture or kill every violent extremist abroad.  We have to improve and 
better coordinate our intelligence, so that we stay one step ahead of shadowy networks. 
44. We will have to take away the tools of mass destruction.  And that's why I've 
made it a central pillar of my foreign policy to secure loose nuclear materials from terrorists, to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and to pursue the goal of a world without them -- because 
every nation must understand that true security will never come from an endless race for ever 
more destructive weapons; true security will come for those who reject them. 
45. We'll have to use diplomacy, because no one nation can meet the challenges of 
an interconnected world acting alone.  I've spent this year renewing our alliances and forging new 
partnerships.  And we have forged a new beginning between America and the Muslim world -- 
one that recognizes our mutual interest in breaking a cycle of conflict, and that promises a future 
in which those who kill innocents are isolated by those who stand up for peace and prosperity and 
human dignity. 
46. And finally, we must draw on the strength of our values -- for the challenges that 
we face may have changed, but the things that we believe in must not.  That's why we must 
promote our values by living them at home -- which is why I have prohibited torture and will close 
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the prison at Guantanamo Bay.  And we must make it clear to every man, woman and child around 
the world who lives under the dark cloud of tyranny that America will speak out on behalf of their 
human rights, and tend to the light of freedom and justice and opportunity and respect for the 
dignity of all peoples.  That is who we are.  That is the source, the moral source, of America’s 
authority.  
47. Since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, and the service and sacrifice of our 
grandparents and great-grandparents, our country has borne a special burden in global affairs.  We 
have spilled American blood in many countries on multiple continents.  We have spent our 
revenue to help others rebuild from rubble and develop their own economies.  We have joined 
with others to develop an architecture of institutions -- from the United Nations to NATO to the 
World Bank -- that provide for the common security and prosperity of human beings. 
48. We have not always been thanked for these efforts, and we have at times made 
mistakes.  But more than any other nation, the United States of America has underwritten global 
security for over six decades -- a time that, for all its problems, has seen walls come down, and 
markets open, and billions lifted from poverty, unparalleled scientific progress and advancing 
frontiers of human liberty.  
49. For unlike the great powers of old, we have not sought world domination.  Our 
union was founded in resistance to oppression. We do not seek to occupy other nations.  We will 
not claim another nation’s resources or target other peoples because their faith or ethnicity is 
different from ours.  What we have fought for -- what we continue to fight for -- is a better future 
for our children and grandchildren.  And we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ 
children and grandchildren can live in freedom and access opportunity.  (Applause.)    
50. As a country, we're not as young -- and perhaps not as innocent -- as we were 
when Roosevelt was President.  Yet we are still heirs to a noble struggle for freedom.  And now 
we must summon all of our might and moral suasion to meet the challenges of a new age.  
51. In the end, our security and leadership does not come solely from the strength of 
our arms.  It derives from our people -- from the workers and businesses who will rebuild our 
economy; from the entrepreneurs and researchers who will pioneer new industries; from the 
teachers that will educate our children, and the service of those who work in our communities at 
home; from the diplomats and Peace Corps volunteers who spread hope abroad; and from the men 
and women in uniform who are part of an unbroken line of sacrifice that has made government of 
the people, by the people, and for the people a reality on this Earth.  (Applause.)  
This vast and diverse citizenry will not always agree on every issue -- nor should we.  But I also 
know that we, as a country, cannot sustain our leadership, nor navigate the momentous challenges 
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of our time, if we allow ourselves to be split asunder by the same rancor and cynicism and 
partisanship that has in recent times poisoned our national discourse.  
52. It's easy to forget that when this war began, we were united -- bound together by 
the fresh memory of a horrific attack, and by the determination to defend our homeland and the 
values we hold dear.  I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity 
again.  (Applause.)  I believe with every fiber of my being that we -- as Americans -- can still 
come together behind a common purpose.  For our values are not simply words written into 
parchment -- they are a creed that calls us together, and that has carried us through the darkest of 
storms as one nation, as one people. 
53. America -- we are passing through a time of great trial.  And the message that 
we send in the midst of these storms must be clear:  that our cause is just, our resolve 
unwavering.  We will go forward with the confidence that right makes might, and with the 
commitment to forge an America that is safer, a world that is more secure, and a future that 
represents not the deepest of fears but the highest of hopes.  (Applause.)   
54. Thank you.  God bless you.  May God bless the United States of 
America.  (Applause.)  Thank you very much.  Thank you.  (Applause.) 
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